Command resiliency : an adaptive response strategy for complex incidents by Pfeifer, Joseph W.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2005-09
Command resiliency : an adaptive response strategy
for complex incidents
Pfeifer, Joseph W.












COMMAND RESILIENCY:  
AN ADAPTIVE RESPONSE STRATEGY  








 Thesis Advisor: Christopher Bellavita 
 Second Reader: Paul Stockton 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average one hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2005 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:   
Command Resiliency: An Adaptive Response Strategy for Complex Incidents 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Joseph W. Pfeifer 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government or the New York City Fire Department. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Many organizations believe they are prepared for the next terrorist event by wrongly assuming there is a 
predictable threat that can be managed with the purchase of new equipment.  Unless organizations develop a 
resilient response strategy that can adapt organizational and operational elements to respond to new terrorist 
incidents, they will find themselves with the same difficulties emergency responders did on 9/11.  As terrorist 
attacks unfold, organizations are pushed beyond their normal capabilities.  How quickly organizations adapt to the 
uncertainty of a new crisis is critical.  Organizations that cannot adapt to new threats of large, complex terrorist 
vents will be less likely to respond effectively to future attacks.   e
 
This paper recommends a resilient response strategy that is flexible enough to adapt to complex incidents. It 
proposes policy recommendations that address organizational strategy and operational crisis management to deal 
with the initial critical hours of a terrorist attack.  Organizational strategy defines core competencies and what 
happens when competencies are pushed beyond their capacity.  Operational crisis management will examine 
situational awareness requirements, flexible decision-making and innovation.  Command resiliency is achieved by 
overcoming organizational bias and integrating organizational preparedness and operational adaptability into a 
synergistic response network. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
87 
14. SUBJECT TERMS   
Adaptability,  Breaking Points,  Command Resiliency,  Core Competencies,  Dynamic Planning,  
Flexible Decision-making,  Fragility Curve,  Innovation,  Organizational Bias,  Situational Awareness, 
Stovepipe Situational Awareness,  Synergistic Response Network 
 












































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
COMMAND RESILIENCY:  
AN ADAPTIVE RESPONSE STRATEGY FOR COMPLEX INCIDENTS 
 
Joseph W. Pfeifer 
Deputy Assistant Chief, Fire Department City of New York 
Chief of Planning and Strategy 
B.A., Cathedral College, 1978 
M.A., Immaculate Conception, 1982 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 























































Many organizations believe they are prepared for the next terrorist event by 
wrongly assuming there is a predictable threat that can be managed with the purchase of 
new equipment.  Unless organizations develop a resilient response strategy that can adapt 
organizational and operational elements to respond to new terrorist incidents, they will 
find themselves with the same difficulties emergency responders did on 9/11.  As terrorist 
attacks unfold, organizations are pushed beyond their normal capabilities.  How quickly 
organizations adapt to the uncertainty of a new crisis is critical.  Organizations that 
cannot adapt to new threats of large, complex terrorist events will be less likely to 
respond effectively to future attacks. 
This paper recommends a resilient response strategy that is flexible enough to 
adapt to complex incidents.  It proposes policy recommendations that address 
organizational strategy and operational crisis management to deal with the initial critical 
hours of a terrorist attack.  Organizational strategy defines core competencies and what 
happens when competencies are pushed beyond their capacity.  Operational crisis 
management will examine situational awareness requirements, flexible decision-making 
and innovation.  Command resiliency is achieved by overcoming organizational bias and 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Many organizations believe they are prepared for the next terrorist event by 
wrongly assuming there is a predictable threat that can be managed with the purchase of 
new equipment.  Unless organizations develop a resilient response strategy that can adapt 
organizational and operational elements to respond to new terrorist incidents, they will 
find themselves with the same difficulties emergency responders did on 9/11.  As terrorist 
attacks unfold, organizations are pushed beyond their normal capabilities.  How quickly 
organizations adapt to the uncertainty of a new crisis is critical.  Organizations that 
cannot adapt to new threats of large, complex terrorist events will not respond effectively, 
risking loss of life to first responders and the people they protect. 
Analyzing the key elements needed during the World Trade Center attack on 9/11 
will provide insight into how organizations must adapt to new terrorist incidents.  Three 
methods are used to do this analysis: 
• Research of the accounts describing the events of that day. 
• Discussions with commanders on how they had to adapt normal 
procedures to command this complex terrorist event.   
• Review of existing literature that supports the conclusions gathered from 
above. 
The author will recommend developing command resiliency that is durable and 
flexible enough to adapt to terrorist attacks and propose policy recommendations that will 
address organizational strategy and crisis management to deal with the initial critical 
hours of a terrorist attack.  These policy recommendations will include developing a 
strategy that defines: 
Organizational Preparedness 
• Core Competency Capabilities – defining the essential roles of an 
organization.  
• Outstripping Capacity – understanding the breaking point of 





• Understanding how organizational bias influences emergency 
responders  
• Understanding how to eliminate organizational bias and develop 
organizational dependency and synergy 
Operational Adaptability 
• Dynamic Planning – using multi-dimensional threat scenarios for 
preparedness 
• The Power of Situational awareness – seeking, exchanging and 
sense-making of information to maintain a common operational 
picture 
• Flexible Decision-Making – making decisions under stress and 
uncertainty 
• Adaptive Innovation – developing organizational, operational and 
technological solutions 
Integrating Command Resiliency 
• Anticipating risk and developing resiliency  
• Developing a synergistic response network 
Organizations must constantly evaluate the effectiveness of their structure and 
performance as it relates to a dynamic threat environment.  Forward-looking strategies 
that help anticipate change that might occur after a crisis, but can be implemented before 
another crisis are critical.  Leaders must move beyond traditional reactive behavior by 
anticipating resiliency and adapting to a changing threat environment for managing 
complex incidents.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2001, at precisely 8:46 a.m., I watched our world 
change forever as American Airlines Flight 11 aimed and crashed into the 
North Tower of the World Trade Center. 
 
The attacks on 9/11, particularly those on the World Trade Center (WTC), forced 
organizations to consider their strategic homeland security role.  Typically, many 
organizations have relied on preventing future incidents or on acquiring new equipment 
for chemical, biological or radiological attacks.  While these initiatives are necessary they 
are not sufficient for developing an effective response.  Organizations responding to 
disasters or terrorist attacks must develop a level of command resilience that enables 
them to cope with unanticipated dangers and adapt quickly to the changing dynamics of 
the crisis at hand.  Organizations need to foresee when emergency responders will be 
stretched beyond their capacity, develop resilient capabilities for managing unpredicted 
risks after they have become manifest and learn how to bounce back during the complex 
incident.1  Rather then relying only on expected scenarios for preparedness, command 
resiliency is the ability to mitigate developing dangers.2
This paper will outline policy recommendations that address organizational 
strategy and operational crisis management procedures for dealing with the initial critical 
hours of a terrorist attack.  An organizational approach explores what happens when 
those traditional emergency responder capabilities or core competencies are pushed 
beyond their capacity, prompting a need for innovation.  Operational crisis management 
requires an adaptive framework for situational awareness and flexible decision-making 
across the emergency responder community.  Integrating both organizational and 
operational approaches requires surmounting organizational biases to develop a unified 
response network. 
 
1 Aaron Wildavasky, Searching for Safety, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 77. 
2 Karl Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001), 69. 
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This paper analyzes how organizational core competencies and systematic social 
biases affect information-sharing and decision-making when organizations are stretched 
beyond their capacity by the shock and stress of a terrorist attack.  This paper is divided 
into four main sections:   
• Chapter II defines an organizational framework for an adaptive response 
strategy by examining four concepts that run throughout the paper—core 
competencies, organizational breaking points, situational awareness and 
flexible decision-making.   
• Chapter III investigates the 9/11 response at the World Trade Center in 
terms of information-sharing and decision-making.   
• Chapter IV analyzes how organizational bias influenced emergency 
responders and what is needed to overcome this systematic shortcoming in 
emergency response.   
• Chapter V focuses on a need for dynamic preparedness for complex 
incidents.  Dynamic preparedness anticipates potential weakness in 
response and identifies opportunities for transformation.  It also defines 
adaptability as the capacity to withstand the surprise of terrorism by 
remaining flexible to new information and the readiness to be innovative 
in adapting to the cumulative stress of an incident. 
 
Four years after the September 11th attacks, we are left with many stories and 
memories of that day.  Yet, even given the significant amount of reporting, there is much 
more to learn from these events.  This paper attempts to put a face on the extreme 
complexity of that day and the challenge of preparing organizations for the next terrorist 
attack.  Analyzing the key elements of the World Trade Center response on 9/11 will 
provide insight into how organizations adapt to complex incidents.  This paper will 
identify the skills and capabilities needed during the first couple of hours of an attack, 
based on an analysis of information gathered from years of discussions with fire 
commanders who have had to adapt normal procedures to manage complex, multiple-
rescue operations.   
Analyzing the World Trade Center response may give us the greatest opportunity 
to prepare emergency response organizations for saving lives in the future.  Effective 
crisis management requires foreseeing organizational breaking points and making 
necessary changes for resiliency prior to an incident.  It also requires that leaders be able 
to adapt to unexpected situations and develop a unified response system robust enough to 
3 
manage complex incidents.  Combining anticipated risk analysis with adaptive response 
strategies leads to command resiliency.   
Given the dynamic and serious terrorist threat, emergency response organizations 
must develop the ability to withstand the cumulative stress of multiple events.  Without 
this type of organizational engineering, these organizations will fall short of providing 
critical services during complex terrorist attacks.  Organizations that are willing to adapt 
to these new threats not only will respond more effectively—saving more lives—but also 
create a greater level of protection for emergency responders. 
 
A. DEFINING THE CHALLENGES  
The events of September 11, 2001, challenged emergency response organizations 
in entirely new ways.  During the first couple of hours of the 9/11 attacks, emergency 
responders in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania had to adapt 
operating procedures to deal with unfolding events.  The New York City Fire Department 
(FDNY), in particular, was faced with multiple terrorist attacks that caused fires and 
emergencies on an incomprehensible scale.  While standard operational procedures 
provide a framework to operate within, they proved insufficient to meet the challenges of 
that day.  The magnitude of the crisis forced emergency response organizations to adapt 
their response to deal with the extreme complexity of the unfolding events.   
This analysis mandates that incident commanders and crisis managers must 
prepare for critical decision-making roles and develop the appropriate capacity for 
innovation and change.  Many organizations believe they are prepared for the next 
terrorist event by wrongly assuming there is a predictable threat that can be controlled 
with the purchase of new equipment.  However, equipment alone will not address the 
issue of preparedness.  Unless organizations develop a resilient response strategy that can 
adapt organizational and operational elements to effectively respond to new terrorist 
incidents, they will find themselves with the same difficulties emergency responders did 




capabilities.  The speed with which these organizations are able to adapt to the 
uncertainty of a new crisis is critical for saving lives and protecting emergency 
responders. 
Despite the best efforts of homeland security and defense, it is impossible to know 
if we are any safer today than we were 9/11.  Much attention has been paid to 
counterterrorism throughout the world, yet Madrid and London witnessed their own 
terrifying attacks, with hundreds killed and injured in similar transit system attacks.  
These attacks paint a clear picture that the terrorist threats remain very real.   
Many observers overlook the extent of the uncertainties surrounding the current 
terrorist threat.  The details of the 9/11 attacks have become so ingrained into our 
perception of preparedness that we do not stop to consider the potential of the next attack.  
For instance, the emergency response community has adapted their response to better 
deal with the “plane crashing into a building scenario” and, as a result, may have a false 
sense of confidence that they have acquired the necessary skills to manage the next 
attack.  However, the reality is the next attack is not likely to look like the last one.  
Military historians often lament the tendency of generals to rely on after-action reports to 
prepare personnel for future actions, in effect preparing them to fight past battles, not 
future ones.  This phenomenon is happening in many emergency response organizations.  
Emergency responders may have become overconfident by becoming familiar with the 
details of the World Trade Center or the London attacks—not realizing no two attacks are 
the same. 
Considering these challenges, crisis managers and strategic planners must make 
decisions for the future in the midst of tremendous uncertainty.  We do not know who the 
next terrorists will be, when or how they will strike or on what scale.  The countless 
unknowns create an environment of uncertainty for emergency responders.  This paper 
will explore these new challenges by asking what organizational model is needed to 
design emergency response strategies that can adapt to the developing demands of 
complex incidents. 
Emergency response organizations must not let crisis preparedness distract them 
from attending to their daily responsibilities.  This is a difficult balance that requires 
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careful analysis and forward-looking vision.  Despite the threat of terrorism, 
organizations must continue to perform their daily activities of firefighting, law 
enforcement and emergency medical services.  Therefore, strategic planners must 
develop a strategy to prepare for both their core missions and new terrorism preparedness 
mandates.  Since cities do not have the luxury of creating stand-alone terrorism response 
forces, emergency responders will need to efficiently utilize limited resources to build 
resiliency and strategically integrate their skills into organizational plans to meet both 
core and terrorism preparedness duties.   
Emergency response organizations must consider whether they need to reinvent 
themselves.  In reality, most emergency response organizations already have the key 
skills necessary for a terrorist response.  Although the nature of any given terrorist attack 
is unpredictable, terrorist incidents ultimately will result in a fire, hazardous material 
release, structural collapse and/or medical emergency.  Therefore, to meet the 
preparedness requirements for terrorism, fire, law enforcement and emergency medical 
services, first responders can build upon existing skill sets and adapt to new threats, 
essentially enhancing their level of proficiency in their core competencies.   
Given the existing established skill sets of various emergency responder agencies, 
defining a distribution of work among agencies within the framework of these possible 
terrorism incidents is essential.  The National Preparedness Guidance speaks of sharing 
preparedness responsibility through collaborating planning efforts and resources.3  
Planning based on capabilities permits specialization by agencies based on one’s unique 
skills or core competencies.  This willingness to collaborate preparedness efforts avoids 
costly duplication of services and gaps in response capabilities.   
The first hour after an attack is the most critical period of response to most 
terrorist incidents.  The skills assembled in this first hour define an organization’s core 
competencies.  Skills brought after this initial stage provide only core support.  It is 
during the initial period that fires and hazardous material releases are mitigated most 
easily, rescues are made, emergency lifesaving measures are most effective, secondary 
devices are found, evacuation is controlled and the public is protected.  Understanding 
3 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance (Washington, D.C., 2005). 
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the limitation of an organization’s capability and capacity in terms of the first hour of an 
incident will regulate the true distribution of work for emergency responders.  Homeland 
Security planning efforts, however, rarely look at what capabilities are brought to the 
scene in the first hour.   
Terrorism is fundamentally a strategy of surprise; terrorists continue to emerge in 
new areas of operation and rapidly adapt to changes in security.  While Homeland 
Security efforts would like us to believe that we can anticipate the next attack, experience 
has shown that the next attack most likely will come as a surprise.  Emergency 
responders must recognize that the problem lies mainly with how we manage the effects 
of the surprise, rather than in the fact that we were surprised.4  Emergency response 
agencies, therefore, must build enough organizational and operational resilience to 
effectively manage the next generation of terrorist attacks.  The WTC attacks give us 
insight into the most critical preparedness areas needed for the future.  They reveal the 
problems and opportunities for dealing with the unexpected and the complex.  This paper 
will explore those critical areas and make recommendations, not from the viewpoint of an 
outsider, but rather from the perspective of an insider who was a part of the command 
structure on 9/11 and who understands the true importance of command resiliency. 
4 Colin S. Gray, Transformation and Strategic Surprise. (Carlisle, Pa.: Army War College, Strategic Studies 
Institute, April 2005), 27. 
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II. ADAPTIVE RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
As fire units entered the World Trade Center, it appeared as if we were 
stepping into a war zone.  The damage in the lobby was extensive.  Untold 
numbers of people were severely injured and trapped.  Seventeen minutes 
later, a second plane crashed into the South Tower.  We were faced with 
one of the largest rescue efforts of any fire department in the world. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to develop an organizational framework for 
commanding large-scale, complex incidents.  This requires four overarching elements:   
• Leverage core competencies or unique capabilities that distinguish one 
organization from the others. 
• Consider what happens when these capabilities are pushed beyond 
organizational capacity as agencies are forced to bear the effects of the 
cumulative stress of a terrorist attack. 
• Define information-sharing requirements to retain situational awareness. 
• Develop flexible decision-making to consider the unexpected.   
 
A. LEVERAGING CORE COMPETENCY 
The events of 9/11 illustrated that emergency responders’ ability to respond to 
acts of terrorism is inextricably linked with their ability to respond to traditional 
firefighting, law enforcement and medical emergencies.  Capabilities that are unique to 
each of these agencies are referred to as core competencies.  Core competencies are 
evaluated for three elements:   
• Capabilities—unique skills that an organization performs. 
• Capacity—how many resources or trained personnel an agency has. 
• Proficiency—how well an organization performs each task. 
 
What makes these elements of core abilities distinctive for an organization is the 
inability of other organizations to easily duplicate the same tasks.5  For example, an 
organization may have some members who are paramedics; however, this does not give 
5 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2004), 375. 
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them the core competency of pre-hospital care.  The FDNY recognized that rather than 
adding core competencies for specific counterterrorism skills, their existing core 
competencies to respond to fire, medical, hazardous materials and structural collapse 
emergencies could be employed to respond effectively to terrorist events, both 
conventional and unconventional.   
Emerging within the terrorism preparedness context is a disturbing trend of 
imbalanced capability building among emergency response organizations.  Rather than 
building the capacity and proficiency of existing capabilities, many groups are redefining 
their missions in terms of the terrorism threat.  To meet new Homeland Security 
demands, many organizations are adding new tasks that extend beyond their core 
competencies, a process that has inherent complications.  For example, emergency 
responders who previously had only a peripheral role in hazardous materials response 
incidents now are training as the primary response force for chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) threats.6   
Establishing the competency for an effective response to these incidents requires a 
familiarization with new detection equipment and a thorough understanding of 
complicated information about the threat environment, as well as complex procedures to 
mitigate the hazard.  These skills mandate an enormous amount of training that is 
perishable if not used often.  The new equipment alone generates additional maintenance 
and inspection tasks that must be performed by organizations already operating with 
limited numbers of personnel.  These dynamics add a host of logistical stress to an 
organization, which can prevent it from concentrating on effectively performing their 
core mandates for providing essential services.  
Today’s environment of robust federal Homeland Security funding has 
encouraged too many city organizations to adopt competitive positions, rather than 
cooperative ones. Vying for funds to increase their individual organization’s perceived 
ability to respond to terrorism not only cheats cities of an optimally resilient emergency 
6 Law enforcement now is performing hazardous material assessment which is a core competency of 
fire departments.  In New York City’s protocol for emergency response, City Incident Management System 
(New York City: April 2005), the police department has added hazardous material assessment as a core 
competency and is the only incident commander (single command) at a terrorist incident involving 
hazardous material.  Other police departments such as LAPD, have acquired hazardous material units. 
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response system of complementary organizations, it may even lessen the ability of all 
involved to perform optimally at the individual level. 
When agencies add new tasks outside their existing competencies, they run the 
risk of diluting the organization’s primary mission.  The effects may not manifest 
themselves during routine operations, but in times of crisis, organizations revert to their 
true principle tasks and may fail at their new terrorist-related mission.  The core for law 
enforcement is protection, criminal investigation and keeping order; for fire departments, 
it is firefighting, hazardous material mitigation and rescue; and for emergency medical 
services, it is pre-hospital patient care.   
Emergency response organizations will, however, benefit from leveraging their 
core competencies—the unique set of strengths that are fundamental to their 
organization—rather than attempting to add new capabilities.  Ultimately, improving the 
ability of emergency responders to respond to the homeland security mission requires that 
commanders link existing skills to the threats of the new environment.  Increasing 
preparedness depends on the strengthening of core competencies, not the addition of new 
capabilities beyond the scope of the department.  Therefore, when properly designed and 
implemented, homeland security preparedness efforts serve to reinforce day-to-day 
operational competencies that can be employed effectively at both major disasters and 
terrorist attacks. The core competencies of fighting fires, delivering pre-hospital care, 
mitigating hazardous material and performing technical rescue for building collapse—as 
well as the homeland mission—are all, therefore, strengthened by every investment in 
planning, training and equipment. The conceptualization of how FDNY’s core 
competencies support the counterterrorism mission is reflected in Figure 1. 
Each type of emergency response organization has complementary skills to offer 
others. However, this optimal outcome is recognized only when emergency response 
organizations leverage their own comparative advantages and work in concert with sister 
organizations (e.g., fire with police) to create synergistic models of cooperation. This 
approach not only allows the contributors to build stronger, more capable organizations 
through focusing on their specific core missions, but ultimately presents a more effective 
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Figure 1.   Core Competencies 
 
For CBRNE incidents, emergency responders will need to execute many different 
tasks simultaneously.  Law enforcement will provide force protection for first responders, 
search for secondary devices, arrest possible suspects and conduct investigations.  Fire 
departments will enter the contaminated scene to assess the hazard, perform rescue and 
evacuation of victims, confine, mitigate or extinguish the hazard and decontaminate 
exposed victims and rescuers.  Emergency medical personnel may need to administer 
antidote to contaminated victims, treat other injuries and transport patients to medical 
facilities.  Each of these tasks requires the enhancement of the organizations’ core 
competencies and not the creation of totally new abilities.   
When building response resiliency, it is critical to recognize that the first hour of 
an incident will require successful performance of the greatest number of essential tasks, 
with the fewest number of support resources.  Effective response requires that all 
agencies are able to supply sufficient resources to perform their respective core duties 
and work in unison, so none of the vital tasks is overlooked.  The danger in adding 
additional tasks to an organization’s response repertoire is that it dilutes the supply of 
available resources to perform its core competencies, allowing almost no level of 




                                                     
B. PUSHED BEYOND CAPACITY 
Once emergency response organizations have identified their core competencies, 
the strategic task of preparedness has only begun.  These organizations next must 
examine the limits of these competencies and plan how to increase their capacity to 
manage the next large-scale event.  As the World Trade Center attacks unfolded, 
organizations faced increasing demands that swiftly outstripped their capacity to mitigate 
the incident.  The incredible strain on response organizations during the first 102 minutes 
and during the aftermath pushed agencies beyond their capability and revealed their 
limited ability to respond to this new breed of complex events.   
In future preparedness efforts it is, therefore, critical for senior commanders to 
understand their organization’s capacity to withstand the initial shock and the cumulative 
stress exerted on their organization during such an incident.  Commanders need to 
carefully track their organization’s capability not only to scale emergency response to 
manage the crisis, but also the ability to maintain service to the rest of the community.  
As the events of 9/11 illustrated, this is not an easy task. 
The ability to withstand increasing degrees of stress is critical to emergency 
responder organizations.  Louise Comfort, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, 
uses engineering “fragility curves” to illustrate this point.  Buildings and bridges are 
designed using “fragility curves” to determine the cumulative effect of stress that a 
structure can withstand before failing.  Crisis managers “may use this same concept to 
identify points at which governmental systems fail under different types of stress.”7   
Evaluation of consequence management performance in terms of breaking points 
is critical to preparedness.  Emergency responders’ capabilities are analyzed for their 
fragility or threshold of limited capacities.  Local resources are examined to determine at 
what point they become overtaxed.  On 9/11, New York City’s extensive emergency 
response system, while robust, was outstripped by a new enemy.  The response 
limitations incurred illustrate the need to understand where emergency breaking points 
might occur.  Such knowledge then can be used to strengthen the system against future 
terrorist attacks.   
7 Louise K. Comfort, “Rethinking Security: Organizational Fragility in Extreme Events,” Public Administration 
Review 62 (September 2002), 102. 
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Understanding when an organization’s capabilities and capacity are outstripped is 
essential for effective crisis management. Without such knowledge, crisis managers 
cannot effectively lead their organizations, nor can the organization effectively respond to 
the crisis at hand.  The world watched in frustration as people on the upper floors of the 
World Trade Center waited to be rescued, an image surpassed only by the memory of the 
collapsing Towers.  The World Trade Center was structurally designed to withstand a 
plane crashing into the building, but was not engineered to withstand the stress of a fast-
spreading fire.  Extending the construction example to emergency responders, fire 
departments were designed to fight high-rise building fires based on the belief that high-
rise buildings are not supposed to collapse.  Law enforcement was designed to fight 
crime in the street, not a foreign enemy using planes as weapons.   
Emergency response systems on 9/11 were designed, on one level, to protect the 
public, but failed when exposed to cumulative stress at a different level.  Both World 
Trade Center Towers and World Trade Center building number seven collapsed due to 
failure of certain structural components when exposed to fire.  Likewise, when one part 
of government fails, the failure then can spread throughout the system.8  The failure of 
law enforcement to prevent the attacks or the inability of the fire department to extinguish 
the fire, points to systematic failure of government when exposed to this unexpected 
terrorist attack.  Understanding these breaking points of our security provides emergency 
responders with the opportunity to redesign more resilient strategies that will be able to 
withstand the cumulative stress of terrorism on different levels.   
The concept of “fragility curves” highlights two important points of analysis for 
any emergency responder organization to consider. First, how much cumulative stress 
can an organization currently withstand before failing? Second, how can an organization 
further develop its capacity to withstand greater amounts of stress in both the short-and-
long-term?  In other words, how can an organization change the shape of its fragility 
curve?   
Using this approach, an organization’s capabilities, capacity and proficiency can 
be modeled by examining routine operations and assessing historical data about 
8 Comfort, Rethinking Security, 102. 
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responses.  Once current capacities for stress are understood, a new model can be 
developed that incorporates the shock of a terrorist attack—a far more dynamic 
emergency, which requires a much different approach and, potentially, scale of response.  
At its most basic level, emergency response “fragility curves” can be described by 
examining the following:  
• Organizational capability, capacity and proficiency (equipment, personnel 
and skills needed to support core competencies) 
• Command capacity (operational adaptability and coordination) 
 
Within the field of emergency management, New York City constantly tracks the 
first factor—the City’s capabilities and resource capacity.  Each agency contributes 
unique skills to the City’s emergency response system.  From routine operations statistics 
are recorded that can help identify minimal and maximum stress effects on emergency 
response, including the type and number of responses.  Organizations can use the fragility 
curve to model both the type of skills and the amount of resources that are available at 
any given time to respond to an incident.   
Measuring the breaking point of proficiency is a critical component for 
preparedness.  Emergency responders need a proficient level of tactical and operational 
skills to use in response to a particular terrorist attack.  These skills must be flexible 
enough to adapt to a dynamic emergency, requiring the ability to scale response to 
potentially large, complex incidents.  A high level of training within an organization’s 
core competencies will prove most adaptable during complex incidents. 
The second dimension of the stress curve—command capacity—is also a 
significant component of preparedness. Organizational leaders need a deeper 
understanding of the strategic threat environment to better prepare and adapt to new 
threats.  Perhaps the greatest stress placed on an organization during a terrorist attack is 
the lack of absolute knowledge during a crisis.  As Bertrand and Lajtha note, building 
command capacity to manage uncertainty is important because “crises are characterized 
14 
                                                     
by the absence of obvious solutions, the scarcity of reliable information when it is 
needed, and the lack of time to reflect on and debate alternative courses of action.”9   
 
C. THE POWER OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
Effective crisis management depends upon having timely and accurate 
information about an incident—what hazards are present and what others might arise.10  
Commanders and crisis managers not only must pay attention to details, but understand 
the magnitude of the incident they are facing.  For these leaders, maintaining situational 
awareness is critical for making sense of evolving events and deciding on necessary 
actions to take.  Having reliable information is also a critical factor in achieving 
coordination among emergency responders.11
As organizations respond to large, complex events, the most frequent and 
valuable assistance each can provide is a real-time exchange of critical information.  The 
challenges in achieving shared situational-awareness stem from the way information is 
collected.  Having each agency search for information is a rapid way to collect various 
pieces of a developing incident.  However, looking for information from the viewpoint of 
a particular agency, by omission, is not looking for other indicators.12  Therefore, it is 
necessary to exchange and compare the information gathered from different sources.  The 
danger arises when agencies keep information to themselves and fail to see the value of 
information provided by other agencies.  All agencies involved must realize that during 
complex incidents, the collection and sharing of small pieces of information are vital to 
forming a single operational picture for all emergency responders.  Sharing information, 
as we will see in Chapters III and IV, may be one of the most challenging hurdles to 
overcome for emergency responders.   
9 Robert Bertrand and Chris Lajtha, “A New Approach to Crisis Management,” Journal of Contingencies and Risk 
Management, 10, No. 4 (December 2002), 184. 
10 Brian A., Jackson et al., Protecting Emergency Responders: Safety Management in Disaster and Terrorism 
Response. (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Publishing, 2004), 24. 
11 Louise K. Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Response to Terrorism and Other Extreme Events.” Ublius  
32:4 (Fall 2002), 30. 
12 Stuart A. Whitehead, “Balancing Tyche: Nonlinearity and Joint Operations,” in National Security 
Challenges for the 21 Century, ed. William Murray (Carlisle, Pa.: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 
April 2005), 34. 
The foundation for developing shared situational awareness is divided into the 
three components depicted in Figure 2.  First, individual agencies seek to assess the 
situation through the gathering of information.  Throughout a crisis, organizations are 
quickly searching for information, based on their core competencies and capabilities.  
Information must be gathered regarding how the crisis condition is interacting with 
people, structures and the environment.  Information is also collected on emergency 
responders, including their location, capability, capacity and how well they are 
controlling the situation.  The retrieved information then is shared within the organization 
and exchanged with other external crisis management stakeholders. These inward-and-
outward-looking components of information-sharing are used to increase organizational 
absorptive capacity for knowledge diversity at an incident.13  “This diversity enables 
people to see different things when they view the ‘same’ event.”14  Situational awareness 
then is achieved by making sense of the shared information.  Sense-making is the ability 
to construct meaning from the information received.  For decision makers, making sense 
of real-time information is necessary for maintaining an accurate understanding of the 












                                                     
13 Cohen, Wesley M., and Daniel A. Levinthal, "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and 
Innovation." Administrative Science Quarterly, 35:1 (March 1990), 133. 
14 Weick and Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected, 60. 
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At a major incident, commanders need accurate and timely information to make 
decisive, and sometimes life-and-death, decisions.  The Gilmore Commission points out 
that the “exchange of information, whether by voice over a radio handset, via computer 
system or directly face to face, is crucial to the effectiveness of response operations and 
to the safety of individual responders.”15  At the World Trade Center, information-
sharing was so poor that critical information never reached any fire department 
commander or the Chief of Department, who was the Incident Commander, leaving 
decision-makers at a severe disadvantage.16   
This lack of information-sharing, where agencies do not share-information outside 
of their own agency, is referred to as “stovepipe situational awareness.”  Analogous to a 
stovepipe, information travels only within a single organization.  As a result, one agency 
had superior situational awareness regarding the fire on the upper floors of the Towers 
while the fire department was left with little or no information.  This inequity of 
information greatly affected the decision-making capacity of some emergency 
responders. 
 
D. FLEXIBLE DECISION-MAKING 
The challenge for those examining the World Trade Center response stems from 
the lack of understanding of how firefighters make decisions under stress and uncertainty.  
The most widely accepted comparison model for decision-making comes from the work 
of Janis and Mann, who define decision-making as a process of comparing a range of 
options, evaluating each option, reexamining the positive and negative consequences of 
each, rating each one, and then determine which the best option is.17  Such laborious 
comparison models may work in some circumstances, but at major crises there is rarely 
enough time or information for it to be useful.   
15 Gilmore Commission, Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess 
Domestic Capabilities for Terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, December, 
2003), 271. 
16 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, (New York: W.M. Norton & Company, 2004), 298. 
17  I.L. Janis and L. Mann, Decision making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment, 
(New York: Free Press, 1977). 
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Commanders and firefighters are usually called to make decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty, where information is missing, unreliable, inconsistent or 
ambiguous and 80 percent of their decisions are made in less than one minute.18  It 
becomes apparent that comparing many options in search of one optimal solution is not 
feasible under these conditions.  Gary Klein, through his extensive research on decision-
making, explains that firefighters do not have the time to compare all possible options; 
instead, they make decisions by using cues to recognize a situation as typical and decide a 
course of action based on experience.  “If the first choice did not work out, they might 
consider others—not find the best, but to find the first one that works.”19  Developing a 
course of action quickly is based on imaging how actions are carried out and adapting to 
new information; not by comparing choices.  This allows the firefighter to act and not be 
paralyzed by evaluating the endless possible choices.   
Decision-making on the fireground is based on conceptual and experiential 
learning—i.e., commanders process types of information during decision moments based 
on what they have learned and seen before.  There is good reason fire commanders and 
firefighters process information this way: it allows them to quickly assimilate key 
information in stressful situations and readily process it, which is a powerful tool as long 
as the stressful situation is the same or similar to those seen before.  
For instance, in a normal building fire, commanders evaluate the stability of the 
burning structure based on previous fires they have witnessed (experiential learning) 
combined with knowledge gained from classroom-type experiences (conceptual 
learning).  Reaching the fire, experienced commanders will look immediately for the key 
indicators of fire damage to the building that, through experience and instruction, they 
will know where to bring hose-lines, where victims are likely to be trapped and which 
routes are the safest for rescuers.  A new commander at a fire does not know where to 
look first to identify these key factors and must take precious time to assess every part of 
the fire before he or she can begin to make suggestions regarding how to approach it.   
18 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1998), 4. 
19 Ibid., 20. 
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The question for building command flexibility is if commanders make decisions 
by recognizing typical situations, is it then possible such cognitive bias can backfire when 
experienced commanders respond to a type of fire they have never seen?  Their natural 
tendency to seek out known, helpful indicators dominates and, thus, they spend time 
scanning for those similar types of signals, perhaps overlooking the subtle signals that are 
the most relevant indicators of details of the new kind of fire.  When events are not 
typical and cues do not fit together, commanders still take action even when they are not 
able to connect all the dots.  Broken-pattern matching alerts fire commanders that 
something is wrong and action must be taken.  It is, perhaps, one of the most intense 
stimulants for decision-making.   
Klein points out when commanders read situations correctly they will match the 
situations to similar experiences; if there is no match, they quickly use their experience to 
recognize the anomalies.20  He gives an example of a fire lieutenant leading his engine 
company into what they believed to be a private dwelling kitchen fire.   
The lieutenant leads his hose crew into the building, to the back, to spray 
water on the fire, but the fire just roars back at them.  Then the lieutenant 
started to feel as if something is not right.  He doesn’t have any clues; he 
doesn’t feel right about the house, so he orders his men out of the 
building—a perfectly standard building with nothing out of the ordinary.  
As soon as his men leave the building, the floor where they had been 
standing collapses.21
 
This example shows how fire commanders use cues that do not fit previous 
experience in order to make command decisions.  The lieutenant was not limited by 
cognitive bias, but instead, used the available information of mismatched cues to make 
decisions.  While not realizing the fire was underneath them in the basement, the cues of 
water not extinguishing the fire, the room getting hotter and an absence of cracking sound 
from the fire signaled the lieutenant that something was wrong and he made the decision 
to withdraw his firefighters.22   
20 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1998), 35. 
21 Ibid., 32. 
22 Ibid. 
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Understanding this decision-making process is critical to understanding the 
response to the World Trade Center.  Commanders at the World Trade Center were 
drawn to certain cues for decision-making that did not fit with their experience. 
Fire commanders, in particular, are always seeking to assemble small pieces of 
information to form an accurate picture of what is happening.  Each piece of information 
builds on the previous pieces, signaling to commanders a new situation that fits or does 
not fit their knowledge.  Experienced fire commanders, such as those at the World Trade 
Center, are able to use bits of information that would be regarded as inconsequential by 
others, but critical for decision-making.  They are not limited by their experience, but are 
open to anomalies as signals to act despite uncertainty.  “Experienced people have an 
impressive ability to withstand time pressure and generate plausible options so they do 
not have to waste effort and attention by comparing lots of options.”23  This openness to 
bits of information that do or do not match experience demonstrates the need for flexible 
decision-making.   
Defining core competencies and their breaking points is necessary for developing 
the proper level of preparedness.  Adapting to the shock and stress of a terrorist attack is 
dependent on information-sharing and flexible decision-making.  These dimensions of 
command often are not fully understood by those who write about the World Trade 
Center response.  It is, however, extremely important to be familiar with these concepts 
in order to understand the actions taken by emergency responders at the World Trade 
Center.  Those who fail to understand these concepts will see the WTC as simply a tragic 
event.  But for those who comprehend these concepts, the next few chapters will present 
a response model for increase resiliency and safety among emergency responders. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF 9/11 RESPONSE 
Each and every firefighter responding to the World Trade Center knew 
that tens of thousands of people were in their greatest moment of need.  In 
those few minutes it took to respond, firefighters looked at the burning 
Towers and into their own hearts and souls, knowing they would be faced 
with the danger of climbing 110 stories and encountering fire to rescue 
those who could not get out.  Nonetheless, they entered the buildings and 
began to climb the narrow stairs. 
 
Analyzing the rescue operations at the September 11th World Trade Center 
response gives substantial insight into why certain actions were taken by emergency 
responders, clearing up many false assumptions and providing a direction for building 
command resiliency.  This chapter examines how emergency response systems were 
easily outstripped and pushed beyond their capacity on 9/11 and what effects this had on 
information-sharing and decision-making.  The chapter will provide an illustration of the 
importance of situational awareness, showing that on 9/11 organizational possession of 
information influenced how command decisions were made and affected how orders 
were followed within and outside participating organizations.   
The World Trade Center response differed from the other events of 9/11 in many 
aspects.  Covering 16 acres, the WTC was a rapidly changing fireground-battlefield, with 
tens of thousands of people at risk, multiple attacks, an advancing fire and the progressive 
deterioration of buildings, cutting off the withdrawal of rescuers, all occurring within 
only 102 minutes.  Within this short time frame, commanders were faced with making 
numerous critical decisions.  We will look at these events not to criticize, but to learn 
how to adapt to the next terrorist incident. 
 
A. DECISION-MAKING 
Since very few people have the experience of managing large, unplanned complex 
incidents, it is important to examine how the response commanders of one of the most 
complex—and certainly unplanned—incidents in history made their operational 
decisions.  Jules Naudet, who filmed the documentary, 9/11, gives us a glimpse of what it 
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was like commanding the rescue operation from inside the lobby of the North Tower of 
the World Trade Center.24  This rare footage, coupled with this writer’s experience, 
provide insight into the decision-making process and help to illustrate three critical 
requirements for decision-making: timely information, appropriate context and command 
flexibility. 
First, commanders continually must scan for new information.  Small pieces of 
information may not mean much by themselves, but the cumulative effect of connecting 
dots of information gives commanders cues for decision-making.  Once there are 
sufficient numbers of cues, commanders decide on the first possible course of action that 
can manage the crisis, rather than meticulously comparing all available options.  “Fast 
decision makers pay close attention to ‘real-time’ information, that is, information about 
current operations or the current environment which is reported with little or no time-
lag.”25  Without the ability to make decisions quickly, commanders would be paralyzed 
by an endless search for information.   
Second, commanders must view the incoming information within the appropriate 
context in order to graps the greatest possible degree of situational awareness.  Context 
allows both the decision maker and the receiver of orders to understand the relevance of 
small cues.  Only those commanders who can recognize a change in the operational 
environment will have the ability to adapt their decision-making to reflect that change.   
And third, while decision-making depends on information and experience, 
commanders also must remain flexible and open to unexpected cues.  The 9/11 film 
illustrates the flexibility of fire commanders who had to make strategic decisions despite 
the lack of reliable information.  This kind of flexibility, or command adaptability, 
enables commanders to modify their strategy and make swift, but informed decisions, to 
fit the characteristics of the evolving crisis.  Flexibility, adaptability and innovation were 
key factors for commanding at the World Trade Center. 
 
 
24 9/11. Documentary by Jules Naudet, Gideon Naudet, James Hanlon, (Aired on CBS, March 2002). 
With permission I viewed the uncut version of the film. 
25 Weick and Sutcliff, Managing the Unexpected, 21. 
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1. Scanning for Cues 
Flexible decision-making is based on scanning for cues to form an updated 
situational-awareness picture in order to make a decision.  Each cue is considered a dot of 
information.  Some dots are connected to experience, while other dots are connected to 
the evolving incident.  These cues or dots of information form a contextual picture that 
assists commanders in making decisions, as well as assisting firefighters in carrying out 
those decisions.   
Twenty-seven minutes before the collapse of the South Tower, there was an order 
given in the North Tower to have firefighters come down to the lobby.  Understanding 
why this decision was made and why it was never followed gives insight into decision-
making during a complex incident.  This analysis also will provide an opportunity to 
build a more resilient decision-making process for future large-scale events.   
At 9:32 a.m., a third plane was reported heading to New York City.  Upon hearing 
this, a Command Chief in the lobby of the North Tower transmitted by radio the 
following: “Car 4-David, to all units come down to the lobby, everyone down to the 
lobby, now.”  The chief receiving this unverified piece of information made a critical 
decision within seconds to abort the rescue operations and ordered firefighters to come 
down to the lobby.  There was no comparison of options; the chief made sense out of the 
information he had and acted accordingly.  Two planes already had crashed into the 
World Trade Center and the potential impact of a third plane made the situation too 
dangerous for firefighters to remain in the Towers.  Almost immediately after giving this 
order to come down, to the lobby it was learned that the report of a third plane was 
unfounded.  The order was never repeated and there was no attempt to contact the 
incident command post or have this message relayed at high wattage by the 
communication vehicle in the street.  In essence, the retreat order was abandoned because 
the situation had changed and it was deemed safe for the rescue operations to continue.   
This example illustrates flexible decision-making and how commanders can 
decide a course immediately after being provided with small pieces of information.  
While this was not a typical event, the commander was able to connect new information 
to his experience of managing other major incidents.  He knew that a third plane would 
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cause catastrophic consequences.  It made sense to have emergency responders come to 
the lobby when there was a threat and then to allow the operation to continue when the 
threat subsided.  His experience and the context of events allowed him to react to new 
information by choosing the first feasible course of action considered.  He was able to 
make decisions based on the situational-awareness picture and the information at the 
time.   
 
2. Contextual Framework 
Firefighters at 9:32 a.m. were somewhere between the second and 20th floors, 
based on National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) assessment that 
firefighters climbing with equipment take about two minute per floor.26  Being so close to 
the lobby, there was a good chance that at least some firefighters would have heard the 
message, yet the 9/11 Commission found no evidence that units actually returned to the 
lobby.27  So why did no one return to the lobby?  The McKinsey Report stated that soon 
after giving the order to come down, the chiefs in the lobby learned that the threat of a 
third plane was false and the chiefs continued the rescue operations.28
Observing actions by firefighters inside the North Tower also gives us insight into 
how evacuation orders are received and what is needed for effective communications.  
For firefighters to make sense of the message, they need to understand the context of the 
orders.29  The 9:32 a.m. message did not meet the criteria for effective communications 
on three levels: 
• The transmitter must establish authority of command. 
• The receiver must have an understanding that the situation has changed. 
• The receiver must hear the message repeated, which relates the command 
to previous experiences of fire building evacuation.   
 
26 National Institute of Technology, Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center 
Disaster: The Emergency Response Operation (Draft) (Washington, DC, 2005), 91. 
27 9/11 Commission Report, 299. 
28 McKinsey & Company, Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness (New York, Fire Department of the City of New 
York, 2002), 32. 
29 Karl E. Weick, “The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly (December 1993,38,4), 628. 
Understanding the context of the situation is referred to by Weick as “Contextual rationality.” 
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The term, “Car 4-David,” used by the chief was not a term recognized by officers 
or firefighters.  It is used as a designation of a command chief by the dispatcher on the 
apparatus radio and not the fireground portable radios.  At high-rise fires, the term 
designating the commander in the lobby is “Lobby Command” or simply “Command.”  
Firefighters needed to recognize this order as one coming from the authority of the 
incident commander or the “Lobby Command.” 
In the stairways of the North Tower, there was little damage and many people 
needed assistance.  It made no sense to leave the building under these conditions.  The 
firefighters needed to be given a situational-awareness update about a third plane to make 
sense of this message. 
Normally, when an order is given to leave the fire building, it is repeated over and 
over again.  Not having this message repeated would lead firefighters to believe that the 
message was an error.  Firefighters needed to connect this message to their experience of 
other situations when they were told to leave the fire building. 
Firefighters did not come down to the lobby because the message did not make 
sense and efforts to continue rescue operations were reinstituted by commanders.  
Decision-making, therefore, must take place within the framework of situational 
awareness.  Without a contextual framework, information may be overlooked or ignored.   
 
3. Recognizing the Unexpected 
The events of 9/11 outstripped the response capacity of emergency services due to 
the events’ scale and complexity.  They also pushed commanders outside of any previous 
experiences or classroom knowledge.  It would have been all too easy for the firefighters 
to have treated the situation as a high-rise fire, albeit a complex one.  The FDNY chiefs 
recognized that a plane hitting the Towers represented an exceptional emergency and 
created a host of issues that they could not have foreseen and, therefore, they remained 
receptive to other abnormalities in the environment throughout the 102 minutes of crisis 
response.   
Under normal conditions, even working in complete blackness, firefighters do not 
abandon rescue operations. Even though they did not know the South Tower had 
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collapsed, the resulting blackness in the North Tower lobby was a cue to the chiefs that 
the situation had changed and they ordered an unprecedented evacuation of rescue 
operations. By escaping their cognitive biases to only make decisions based on 
experience, commanders in the North Tower, through their actions, ultimately saved 
many of the firefighters’ lives.  
What many saw on television, the chiefs in the North Tower did not see, for them, 
the whole pattern of events just did not fit.  There was no information on what took place; 
there was no matching this situation to the chiefs’ experiences; there was only a loud 
roar, blinding dust and complete darkness.  These commanders used this mismatch of 
cues and unconnected pieces of information as an indication that something had gone 
wrong and made the decision to evacuate the building.   
Hearing repeated messages from chiefs and feeling the building shake, provided 
firefighters with the context that the situation had changed, enabling them to make sense 
of the evacuation order and prompting them to descend the stairs.30  Comparing this order 
to the order given earlier, illustrated the importance of situational awareness.  
Unfortunately, other available contextual information that would have changed the 
evacuation from unhurried to rapid never reached the fire department.   
 
B. THE EFFECTS OF CUMULATIVE STRESS 
As 9/11 response expanded, the emergency services of New York City surged to 
meet the demands of the situation.  What began initially as a two-alarm fire response 
rapidly escalated to three sequential fifth alarms; one fifth alarm for each of the two 
towers and a third fifth alarm for additional resources.31  This then progressed into 
recalling all off-duty firefighters.  Yet, at 8:46 a.m., when the first plane struck the North 
Tower, it was not clear that the incident was going to escalate to this level.  After the 
second plane hit the South Tower, the situation was extremely complex and dangerous, 
but the situation was manageable, even if at the extremes.   
30 FDNY Oral History of 9/11, a member of Ladder 1 describes that he did not know that the South Tower had 
collapsed, but knew something was wrong, and hearing the evacuation order by chiefs understood the order to leave the 
building. 
31 McKinsey & Company, Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness. 
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When the towers collapsed, however, the situation exceeded the capacity of the 
entire City of New York to respond.  Far beyond a city-wide response, the crisis required 
massive federal aid and assistance from many organizations. The lessons from that 
morning are clear: no matter what equipment organizations may possess, they must 
develop, test and evaluate their ability to scale their response rapidly to an event as it 
unfolds and be able to bear the shock and cumulative stress of a terrorist event upon 
response capabilities.   
The shock of 9/11 caused organizations to become isolated and organizational-
centric, concentrating only on their own organization.  This was not apparent until the 
cumulative effects of stress built with the collapse of the South Tower.  At this point, 
organizations were pushed beyond their capacity for search and rescue, medical care and 
criminal investigation.  Organizational fight for survival now became more dependent on 
inter-agency unity but instead agencies operated independently.  The organization with 
the most resilient infrastructure for information had the best percentage of survival; 
others were left to fend for themselves. 
 
C. ESCAPE FROM THE NORTH TOWER 
This case study compares two separate situational-awareness pictures given to 
emergency responders.  The most accurate and timely situational-awareness reports given 
by New York Police Department (NYPD) aviation produced a rapid evacuation with a 
sense of urgency.  The majority of the emergency responders within the North Tower, 
however, did not receive the same situational-awareness report of urgency, which caused 
an unhurried evacuation.  Comparing these two cases demonstrates the severe 
consequences of “stovepipe situational awareness.” 
The analysis looks at the radio transmission on 9/11 between the time the South 
Tower collapsed at 9:59 a.m. and the collapse of the North Tower at 10:28 a.m.  
Messages transmitted during the 29 minutes between the collapses of the towers were 
given by radio to emergency responders according to each organization’s intra-agency 
protocol.  No messages were transmitted by radio, computer or face-to-face contact 
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between the two primary response agencies, resulting in separate operational pictures of 
the fires upper floors, thus creating “stovepipe situational awareness.”   
 
1. NYPD Rapid Evacuation 
When the South Tower first collapsed, NYPD Emergency Service Unit (ESU) 
teams in the North Tower, like firefighters, had no idea what occurred.  After witnessing 
the first collapsed building of the World Trade Center from the air, NYPD aviation units 
immediately radioed the collapse of the South Tower and the ESU dispatcher gave five 
emergency transmissions, ordering all emergency service officers to get out of the North 
Tower.32   
At 10:01 a.m., an ESU detective at the NYPD command post on Church and 
Vesey Streets saw the South Tower collapse and ordered the evacuation of all ESU units 
from the WTC complex.33  An ESU officer inside the North Tower heard the message 
clearly about the collapse, but could not comprehend how a 110-story building could 
collapse, so he asked for the message to be repeated.  It then was explained that the South 
Tower was gone and the North Tower building they were in was in imminent danger of 
similar collapse.34  That message was an alarm for all ESU units to immediately begin 
their evacuation.   
For these officers, it now made sense why they needed to leave rapidly.  But it 
was these additional helicopter radio transmissions of observed fire conditions and 
building instability that made it more and more apparent to not simply evacuate the 
building, but rapidly escape from its inevitable collapse.  These transmissions from the 
police helicopter were given over an NYPD Special Operation Division (SOD) frequency 
that was monitored by ESU officers inside and outside the North Tower.35   
 
32 Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, 102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive inside the Twin Towers 
(New  York: Times Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 214. 
33 The 9/11 Commission Report, 309. 
34 The 9/11 Commission Staff Statement 13 (May 18, 2004), 24-25. 
35 Studies conducted by the 9/11 Commission, NIST WTC Investigation, NYPD McKinsey Report and New York 
Times authors Dwyer and Flynn have slightly different times for each NYPD helicopter report.  However, they agree on 
content. 
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10:00 a.m. A member of the NYPD aviation unit radioed that the South Tower had 
collapsed immediately after it happened, and further advised all people in 
the WTC complex and nearby area should be evacuated.36
10:07 a.m. The pilot of Aviation 14, radio: “Advise everyone to evacuate the area in 
vicinity of Battery Park City, about fifteen floors down from the top, it 
looks like it’s glowing red.  It’s inevitable.”37
 To be certain that the message was delivered, the dispatcher repeated it, 
practically word by word, so that all the police officers on the air heard the 
warning. ‘All right, he said from the 15th floor down, it looked like the 
building was going to collapse and we need to evacuate everyone...’38
10:08 a.m. A moment later, the pilot of Aviation 6, reported, “I don’t think this has too 
much longer to go, I would evacuate all people within the area of the 
second building.”39
10:20 a.m. NYPD aviation unit reports that the top of the tower might be leaning. 
(NYPD SOD Radio Channel)40
10:21 a.m. NYPD aviation unit reports that the North Tower is buckling on the 
southwest corner and leaning to the south. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)41
 NYPD officer advises that all personnel close to the building pull back 
three blocks in every direction. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)42
10:27 a.m. NYPD aviation unit reports that the roof is going to come down very 
shortly. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)43
 
It is clear from these reports that NYPD officers had a comprehensive situational 
awareness, not only of the collapse of the South Tower, but also the imminent danger of 
collapse to the building they were occupying.  The McKinsey Report states that NYPD 
“aviation warns that WTC 1 collapse is likely and advises immediate evacuation.”44  The 
officers who received these messages were able to correctly make sense of the 
36 9/11 Commission Report, 309. 
37 Dwyer and Flynn, 102 Minutes, 223. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Dwyer and Flynn, 102 Minutes, 223 and supported by Staff Statement 13, 25. 




44 McKinsey & Company, Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response, (2002), 50.  
This evacuation warning was given to police personnel. 
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information received and quickly evacuate the building.  Each subsequent message had a 
cumulative effect of added urgency, plus multiple validations of the original report.   
Eyewitness reports indicated that ESU officers did not remain and, at one point, 
were jumping from landing to landing by sliding down the stair banisters.  These reports 
confirm the importance of the helicopter messages for understanding that the building 
was about to collapse and the officers needed to rapidly evacuate the building.  For these 
officers, situational-awareness reports received from NYPD Aviation and members 
outside the building were critical to their escape from the North Tower, most likely 
saving their lives. 
 
2. FDNY Unhurried Evacuation 
The situational-awareness picture for the Fire Department of the City of New 
York (FDNY) was vastly different than that of the police department.  When the South 
Tower collapsed at 9:59 a.m., rescuers on the upper floors felt the building shake, similar 
to a small earthquake.  Simultaneously, operational commanders in the lobby had debris 
dust fill their location, forcing them to move to a passageway between the North Tower 
and 6 World Trade Center (the adjacent building).  As the South Tower collapsed in front 
of them, the Chief of Department and his command staff, located on the far side of West 
Street, abandoned the command post and took shelter in a parking garage under the 
World Financial Center.  Throughout the incident, there was the obvious absence of any 
NYPD commanders at both the incident command post and the operations section.  These 







                                                     
10:00 a.m. The South Tower total collapse was immediately communicated on the 
Manhattan dispatch channel by a FDNY [fire] boat…no one at the site 
received this information, because every FDNY command post had been 
abandoned.45
 Despite the lack of knowledge of what had happened to the South 
Tower a chief in the process of evacuating the North Tower lobby 
sent out an order within a minute of the collapse: “Command to 
all  units in Tower 1, evacuate the building.”46  [Immediately], 
some chiefs and firefighters on the upper floors of the North 
Tower heard the evacuation instruction and repeated it to other 
firefighters. 47
10:10 a.m. Another chief [after moving from the lobby of the North Tower to the 
North Bridge (connecting WTC to the World Financial Center)], “soon 
followed with an additional evacuation order….”48
10:15 a.m. The Chief of Department issued a radio order for all units to evacuate the 
North Tower.49
 
Of the 100 interviews conducted by the 9/11 Commission and its review of 500 
internal FDNY oral histories, only three firefighters mention hearing any possibility of 
“imminent collapse.”50  Indeed, most firefighters in the North Tower had little idea that 
the South Tower had collapsed and did not receive warning messages from police 
aviation predicting the collapse of the North Tower.51  FDNY, as well as the Port 
Authority police, were never provided with the critical information that NYPD possessed.   
 
3. The Importance of Sharing Information 
While the 9/11 Commission shied away from using the term “stovepipe 
situational awareness,” to describe inter-agency communication, it did recognize that 
critical information was not shared among agencies and FDNY chiefs would have 
45 9/11 Commission Report, 306. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, 307. 
48 Ibid, 306. 
49 Ibid, 308. 
50 Ibid, 550. 
51 Ibid, 554.  
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benefited greatly had they been able to receive the same situational-awareness picture as 
the NYPD.52  The situational-awareness picture for the fire department members inside 
the North Tower was limited to a rumbling sound and orders to evacuate the building.  
The fire department received no updates about the spreading fire or the deterioration of 
the building.  There were no warnings of possible building collapse from helicopters to 
reinforce the urgent need for a rapid evacuation.   
Essential to situational awareness is the need to make sense of the information 
received.  Organizational psychologist Karl Weick describes the basic human process of 
“sensemaking” as a “search for context within which small details fit together and make 
sense.”53  The more detailed the information is, the better the “sensemaking” capability 
of the receiver.   
The NYPD and FDNY case studies dramatically portray how emergency 
responders reacted to different levels of situational awareness.  Information about the 
collapse of the South Tower, the spread of the fire and potential collapse of the North 
Tower provided the police department with enough information to precipitate a rapid 
evacuation, while the lack of available information for the fire department translated into 
an unhurried evacuation—and the lethal consequences that followed.  These facts 
illustrate how information-sharing affects emergency responders’ interpretation of 
evacuation orders.   
The strongest statement about the dangers of “stovepipe situational awareness” 
comes from a two-year-long investigation by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. That systematic investigation concluded that “a preponderance of evidence 
indicates that emergency responder lives were likely lost at the WTC resulting from the 
lack of timely information-sharing and inadequate communication capabilities.”54  This is 
further clarified by the 9/11 Commission that any radio failure, while important, “was not 
the primary cause of many firefighters’ deaths in the North Tower.”55  The main reason 
why so many firefighters died in the North Tower was that those commanders in 
52 9/11 Commission Report, 321. 
53 Karl Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 133. 
54 NIST, Draft, 174. 
55 9/11 Commission Report, 323. 
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possession of vital information from police helicopters never shared it with FDNY, 
resulting in an uneven distribution of critical information.   
An unhurried evacuation made perfect sense to those who lacked situational 
awareness in the North Tower.  Equally, it made perfect sense to those police officers 
who heard the repeated warnings of possible collapse to leave the North Tower as rapidly 
as possible.  “If events are noticed, people make sense of them, and if events are not 
noticed, they are not available for sensemaking.”56  Those emergency responders with the 
power of situational awareness were able to escape the collapse of the North Tower; 
those with no situational awareness did not stand a chance.   
Commanding during a crisis is dependant upon strengthening information-sharing 
to maintain common situational awareness.  When an organization possesses critical 
information, it must be immediately shared with other commanders and all emergency 
responders operating at an incident which, in turn, enables emergency responders to make 
sense of and act quickly to new messages.  The single most important safety lesson 
learned by emergency responders on 9/11 is to simply share information.  Command 
resiliency is directly connected to the power of situational awareness. 
56 W.H. Starbuck & F.J. Millken, “Executives’ perceptual filters: What they notice and how they make sense,” 
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL BIAS 
At 9:59 a.m., the South Tower collapsed. What the world saw on 
television, we could not see. Our world in the lobby of the North Tower 
went black. In darkness, I radioed to the firefighters above. “Command to 
all units in Tower 1, evacuate the building!” While many of the 
firefighters assisting people heard the message, they were already dozens 
of floors above ground level. Little did we know that time was running out. 
 
This chapter examines how organizational bias influenced emergency responders 
at the World Trade Center.  The analysis illustrates the negative effect organizational bias 
has on commanding complex incidents.  Most importantly, this chapter provides a model 
for overcoming organizational bias—something vital for effective Homeland Security 
and the command of complex incidents of terrorism. 
 
A. THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL BIAS 
In trying to understand critical aspects of the response of New York City agencies 
to the crisis at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, many observers overlook 
the effects of years of inter-agency fighting for sole command power. The following 
analysis explores the impact that social group behavior has on information-sharing under 
conditions of stress and uncertainty.   
The action aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the likelihood of sharing vital 
information at critical times during complex incidents becomes greater when groups that 
ordinarily are competing or acting independently are organized to act as an integrated 
group under a unified command where all members are equally responsible for 
command-coordinated action.  However, to achieve this level of integration, biases need 
to be overcome. 
Social identity that promotes power of one organization over another organization 
produces two social outcomes during complex incidents.  First, there is the creation of a 
positive in-group bias toward those who are part of the same group and a negative out-
group bias against those who are part of an alternate group.  When providing information 
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across groups, individuals are prone to give more information to members of their own 
group and less to members outside that group.57  Secondly, when under stress, 
individuals feel little obligation to share valuable information with those outside their 
group since responsibility for acting is diffused within their in-group.  This phenomenon 
excludes the out-group from receiving information that may be vital to their operation.   
To fully understand the power of organizational (systematic) bias, one must 
examine how information-sharing within and outside groups influenced the evacuation of 
first responders from the North Tower of the World Trade Center.  As demonstrated, the 
most accurate and timely information reported by police aviation produced a rapid 
evacuation with a sense of urgency. However, the majority of the emergency responders, 
including firefighters within the North Tower, did not receive the same situational-
awareness report of urgency. That information-transmission failure was responsible for 
an unhurried evacuation without any sense of apparent urgency.  Comparing these two 
cases demonstrates the severe consequences of keeping critical information within an 
organization.  It also raises the more important question regarding why commanders of 
one agency did not communicate vital information to another. 
 
B. UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL BIAS 
The case studies in the previous chapter revealed the vital role that information-
sharing or lack of it played in decision-making at the World Trade Center.  
Simultaneously, it is shocking to think that critical information was not shared among 
first responders from these New York City agencies.  Some observers would like to 
conclude that it was a technological problem with portable radios, but the 9/11 
Commission confirmed that the evacuation messages were heard.58 Furthermore, the 
NIST investigation concluded that the WTC repeater (a system to boost radio signals) 
57 A summary of the research and theoretical perspectives regarding social biases focused around social identity 
and intergroup biases can be found in the overview chapter by social psychologist Kay Deaux, “Social Identification,” 
in Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Ed. E.T. Higgins and A.W. Kruglanski (New York: Guilford 
Press, 1996.): 777-798, and Philip Zimbardo, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil,” The Social 
Psychology of Good and Evil (A. Miller, ed., New York: Guilford, 2004). 
58 9/11 Commission Report, 554. 
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was incapable of working after the South Tower collapsed and would not have assisted in 
the evacuation of firefighters from the North Tower.59   
A lack of radio interoperability is another theory used to account for the 
communication gap among agencies.  However, agencies, commanders and personnel 
were within a short distance of each other.60  Regardless of any prior history of infighting 
between the police and fire departments, it is inconceivable that any commander would 
ever deliberately withhold vital information that could save the lives of personnel from 
another organization.  Then why did police commanders over the course of 29 minutes 
remove their members from the vicinity of the towers and not think to inform the fire 
department of the dangers observed by police aviation?  One answer lies in years of 
organizational biases within the first responder community, where organizations are 
generally autonomous.  This is not a conscious bias by individuals, but rather a long-
standing bias on a systematic level. 
Organizational bias stems from the desire to belong to an omnipotent group that is 
capable of excluding those who are not part of the group.  In government, it usually is 
demonstrated through command power and the power to control information.  The turf 
battles between NYPD and FDNY mirror those recently made public between the CIA 
and FBI. In both instances, the key to understanding the failure to share information for 
command of incidents or operations is ultimately a quest for superiority of one agency 
over the other.   
This inter-group competition is illustrated by a lack of cooperation, duplication of 
effort and strict control of information that might benefit the other.  Many times, one 
group wishes to exclude the other from an operation or is not forthcoming with 
information, simply to demonstrate its perceived group power over another.  This bias not 
only leads to one group having an advantage over the other, but it systematically 
conditions groups to think inwardly only of themselves.   
One would expect that these social biases would be abandoned during times of 
crises; however, the WTC case studies illustrate a stronger bias toward individual group 
59 NIST, 138. 
60 NIST, 162. 
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self-interest, proving a fatal flaw for first responders.  Even with thousands of police 
officers and firefighters at the scene and many only a few feet from each other, reports 
from the police helicopter never reached any fire chief.  During the 9/11 World Trade 
Center attack, first responders were unable to overcome their organizational biases, 
causing a fragmented command structure.  One can observe the ramification of these 
biases under three different command conditions:  
• Resistance to a single incident commander. 
• Development of blindspots in command capacity. 
• Diffusion of personal command responsibility. 
 
First is the failure of pre-incident planners to recognize that at terrorism incidents, 
with multiple agencies, social biases cause organizations to resist a single incident 
commander.  The WTC response depicted a refusal by agencies to operate under the fire 
department’s incident commander.  Agencies implicitly think of themselves as being 
most important and, as a group, their natural tendency is to resist being under command 
of another organization.  This is especially true for police and fire departments whose 
organizational development reinforces a sense of belonging to an important group.  These 
organizations call themselves the “Finest” and “Bravest” and each has significant roles to 
play during a terrorist incident.   
During large complex incidents, agencies must change this perception by viewing 
themselves as being equally important and necessary to the outcome of the operation. 
Doing so eliminates the tendency to hold back information in the quest for retaining or 
obtaining power.  Organizational social biases will engender considerable resistance to 
accepting a single incident commander—who is not “one of their own”—when the group 
believes its role to command is equally important to the outcome of the incident.  
Second is the development of blindspots in command capacity.  These blindspots 
develop as part of a group bias toward members of the same group and against those 





                                                     
was provided within one group, but not shared across groups.  It also is found that as 
stress and complexity of a crisis increase, people tend to narrow their focus on aspects 
judged most important to them.61   
As the intensity of the WTC crisis increased, police commanders became so 
focused on central organizational tasks, they neglected to perform the critical task of 
information-sharing.  Their command capacity became so myopic they did not recognize 
the information from helicopters might be significant for the fire department.  Critical 
messages were never passed from the police to the firefighters or their commanders, nor 
did fire commanders ever request information from police on conditions as seen from 
police aviation.  Both organizations were so preoccupied with performing their own 
operations that they developed blindspots that reduced their own command capacity.  
These agencies never crossed group boundaries to consider the welfare of the other, nor 
considered how the other could have contributed to the welfare of their own organization.   
Third is organizational diffusion of responsibility away from the individual and 
toward the group.  Many ranking police officers in the street heard reports from police 
aviation warning of structural failure and acted quickly to move their members to safety, 
yet they never considered telling the fire department.  When asked, they could not explain 
why they pulled back police officers but did not make sure firefighters also were 
withdrawn quickly, except to say, “I thought the fire department was evacuating, too.”  
Indeed a few firefighters and police officers together in the North Tower felt individually 
responsible to tell each other to evacuate the building, but there is no evidence that 
detailed messages from helicopters were ever relayed to fire personnel.  Most 
disconcerting is that many officers did not feel individually responsible for ensuring that 
the fire department knew why it was urgent to evacuate the North Tower.   
Similar group dynamics played out in 1964 when 38 people could not explain 
why they did not phone police as they witnessed the stabbing death of Kitty Genovese in 
Forest Hills.62  In these cases, “the presence of others diffused the sense of personal 
61 Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, 102. 
62 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, 
Brown and Company, 2000), 27. 
responsibility of any individual.”63  When people are in a group they assume that 
someone else will make the notification or, since no one is acting, there is not really an 
urgent problem.   
 
 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS






























Numerous emergency evacuation 
messages by dispatcher.
15 floors glowing red. It’s inevitable.
Looks like the building is going to collapse.
Does not have too much longer to go.
Top of the tower is leaning.
The North Tower is buckling on the 
southwest corner and leaning to the south.
Building evacuation 
ordered by chief officers.
 
Figure 3.   Organizational bias blocks information-sharing and reduces sensemaking.  
Routine use of unified command removes organizational biases, allowing 
information-sharing to take place. 
 
On 9/11, it was assumed that some police commander had to have told the fire 
department about messages from police aviation.  Or, it was assumed that it was not a 
problem if the fire department did not receive this exclusive information about the fire on 
the upper floors because they were evacuating their members anyway.  To this day, there 
is not a public statement of a sense of personal responsibility by any police commander 
for not sharing information with the fire department. That absence of concern supports 
                                                     
63 Philip Zimbardo, “A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil,” The Social Psychology of Good and 
Evil (A. Miller, ed., New York: Guilford, 2004), 42. 
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the theory that people feel less responsible for their behavior when their focus is 
narrowed by an in-group mentality.  Ironically, if there was a unified command at the 
WTC with one fire department incident commander and one police department incident 
commander, there would have been a sense of responsibility not only for one’s own 
organization, but also for the other’s organization and many more firefighters and other 
emergency responders would be alive today.  
 
C. UNIFIED COMMAND  
Evaluating the events of 9/11 and the effects of systematic social bias is not 
intended to assign blame or exonerate any first responder.  It is intended to help develop a 
command system that is resilient enough to overcome these organizational biases in 
future crisis events.  The World Trade Center responses demonstrate the shortcomings of 
advocating a single incident commander.  After completing its investigation, the 9/11 
Commission strongly recommended, “when multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions 
are involved, they should adopt a unified commend.”64   
To overcome social bias, organizations with a major role at terrorist events must 
not seek to control each other, but instead work equally in synergistic fashion to 
command the incident.  A unified command allows agencies with different functional 
responsibilities to work effectively without affecting individual agency authority.65  
Incident commanders in a unified command structure will eliminate organizational 
blindspots by combining knowledge to build a more robust command.  Each incident 
commander will take individual responsibility for jointly sharing information and 
developing operational objectives.  Incident commanders in a unified command will have 
prior training, a new sense of command and will be personally responsible to each other 
for all actions taken at an incident.   
Today’s Homeland Security efforts of exercising together under a unified 
command provide a good first step.  However, it may not be enough to overcome these 
ingrained social biases.  It is documented that as stress increases, people tend to abandon 
64 9/11 Commission, 397. 
65 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, D.C., 2004), 11-12. 
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recently learned responses and fall back on over-learned systematic responses.66  Public 
service organizations need to repeatedly practice how to systematically depend on each 
other at small incidents, as well as at large-scale terrorist events.  During these incidents, 
it is necessary to develop a network of organizations that uses common language and 
participates in everyday social interaction.67  Organizations that seek power over another 
through their endorsement of a single commander at inter-agency incidents will revert 
back to an individual group bias during a terrorist event.  Only through daily practice of 
unified command and organizational dependency on each other, can agencies hope to 
prevail over systematic social biases, thereby enabling organizations to coordinate their 
strengths in effectively dealing with the next terrorist incident.   
Commanding during a crisis is dependant upon overcoming organizational biases 
and strengthening information-sharing to maintain a common situational-awareness 
picture of the crisis venue.  When organizations possess critical information, members 
must feel responsible for sharing it with other emergency responders operating at an 
incident.  Information-sharing provides emergency responders with an opportunity to 
make sense of any emergent ambiguity and act quickly to new messages.   
Finally, there is the need for building a synergistic response network for 
preparedness.  This point cannot be overstated.  The term network implies 
interconnection into a cohesive fabric.  In the context of incident response, this cohesion 
is only possible through a thorough familiarity with the capabilities and limitations of 
each member of the network and a willingness to overcome organizational bias to ensure 
a free flow of information among all members.  
Commanding complex incidents is directly connected to the systematic 
development of a unified command at everyday incidents and building a mutual system 
of respectful interaction with each other.  Unless our public service organizations can be 
integrated into a unified command group, where decisions are made with full awareness 
of the capabilities and capacities of each of the relevant groups, we are doomed to be  
 
66 R. P. Barthol and N. D. Ku, “Regression under stress to first learned behavior,” Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology (59): 134-136,  and K.Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, 102. 
67 J.P. Walsh and G.R. Ungson, “Organizational Memory,” Academy of Management Review (16): 60. 
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governed by our organizational biases and repeat the mistakes of limiting command 



























                                                     
V. DYNAMIC PREPAREDNESS 
Then, at 10:28 a.m., after fighting our way out into the street, I heard the 
roar of the North Tower starting to collapse. The beautiful morning that 
was filled with sunshine turned black. After the collapse, in the darkness 
there was complete silence. It was like a first snowfall: you heard nothing; 
there were no radio communication; there was only an eerie silence. 
When I stood up, I saw the skeletons of the collapsed buildings. 
 
Command resiliency entails adapting to new challenges of complex and 
unexpected events.  As the uncertainty of these events unfolds, there is a greater need for 
organizational adaptability, flexibility, innovation and a keen understanding of the limits 
of an organization’s capabilities.  
Dynamic preparedness requires the ability to adapt to the new threat environment 
on both an organizational and operational level. “An ability to adapt will be critical in a 
world where surprise and uncertainty are the defining characteristics of our new security 
environment.”68  The next terrorist attack will not be limited to a finite set of scenarios.  
Most likely, it will come as a surprise, in timing, location and form.  Command resiliency 
will require commanders to adapt to an evolving threat through the understanding of 
organizational breaking points and the training of operational personnel for flexible 
decision-making and innovation during an incident.  To achieve this goal requires a new 
model of planning—one of dynamic planning—which is used by commanders to develop 
procedures to deal with uncertainty through the use of multi-dimensional threat scenarios. 
Dynamic planning does not only look outward at the threat environment, but also 
inward at the organization itself.  Emergency response organizations need to evaluate 
their strategic and operational capabilities to manage potential attacks from two 
perspectives: 
• Understanding breaking points of core competencies for organizational 
preparedness 
• Developing operational adaptability (flexibility and innovation) 
 
68 Donald Rumsfeld, “21st Century Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces,” Speech, National Defense University, 
Fort McNair, Washington, DC, January 31, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html. 
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This evaluation is done through the use of dynamic scenarios.  Peter Schwartz 
describes using scenarios as a tool to help decision-makers deal with uncertainty by 
considering alternate courses of action.69  The scenarios are not predictions of the future; 
rather, they are vehicles that assist people in learning the presence of alternative tactics.70  
Scenario building enables commanders to identify the blindspots in their static planning 
process and assists in developing adaptability to deal with uncertainty.  Dynamic 
planning is the conduit between existing core competencies and future resiliency.   
 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
Identifying breaking points through the use of the fragility curve as a part of 
dynamic planning is an exercise that is usually neglected by planners.  However, it is 
imperative that agencies use this tool to take a close look at their capacity to withstand 
different forms of attacks.  When organizations use this type of planning they will 
discover the inevitable outstripping of capabilities and the discovery of blindspots in 
existing policies and protocols.  For example, failure to institute a unified command to 
manage terrorist incidents and plan for new firefighting equipment were unidentified 
breaking points or blindspots in preparedness before 9/11.  Dynamic planning takes the 
lessons learned from 9/11, along with the examination of new scenarios, and focuses 
organizations on the need to identify and deal with these critical breaking points.   
The utilization of the “fragility curve” for dynamic scenario planning promotes 
innovation within core competencies in the face of uncertainty.  To use this dynamic 
planning effectively, leaders must move beyond our traditional tactics against a fixed or 
static set of scenarios and demand resilient and adaptive leadership at both strategic and 
operational levels.  Progressive leaders will take the necessary steps to recognize 
breaking points in their organization and then make the changes needed to position their 
organization to better adapt to the surprise of an unforeseen event through dynamic 
planning. 
69 Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View (New York: Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1991), 4. 
70 Schwartz, 6. 
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To effectively demonstrate how the “fragility curve” model works in the context 
of evaluating the 9/11 attacks, it is important to understand the details of the 9/11 
response from the time the planes struck the World Trade Center until the collapse of 
both the North and South Towers.  It is during this time period that the City’s emergency 
responders were without extensive State or Federal assistance.  This examination reveals 
that emergency responders on 9/11 were, in fact, stretched beyond their capacity.  It also 
reveals new opportunities to incorporate more resiliency into the City’s emergency 
response system and further clarifies that jurisdictions must understand their response 
vulnerability and counteract it with greater resiliency. 
 
1. Resource Capabilities 
The FDNY’s 11,000 plus firefighters and almost 3000 medical personnel gave the 
fire department great flexibility in responding to the World Trade Center attack, while 
maintaining emergency services for the rest of the City.  On 9/11, the fire department’s 
response time for fire incidents in other parts of the city increased by only one minute.71  
Yet, more than 200 fire department units responded to the WTC within the first hour.  
Upon initial analysis of the event between 8:46 and 10:28 a.m. it appears that resource 
capacity was not a problem for the country’s largest fire department.  But, in fact, there 
was one significant resource capability deficit, which would have gone unnoticed, except 
for the 9/11 Commission’s public hearings held in New York in May of 2004. 
One of the members of the 9/11 Commission asked Fire Commissioner Nicholas 
Scoppetta what the fire department would do if there was another similar attack in New 
York City, where people were trapped on the upper floors in a high-rise building, with a 
fire that could not be extinguished and all exit stairs blocked by flames.72  Commissioner 
Scoppetta had no definitive answer.  Later, in private conference, fire chiefs also were 
unable to provide an answer.  New York City is not unique in this regard.  In effect, the 
fire service in the United States has yet to answer the principal question of the 9/11 
hearings: what do we do if it happens again?  Even more disconcerting is that no one has 
demanded an answer. 
71 McKinsey, Increasing Preparedness for the FDNY, 38. 
72 9/11 Commission Public Hearings, May 18, 2004. 
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The single, most significant response capability breaking point disclosed by the 
World Trade Center attack on 9/11 was that the fires on the upper floors, which 
weakened the building enough to cause a progressive collapse, could not be extinguished 
with existing resource capabilities.  If the fires had been extinguished, it is likely that the 
buildings would not have collapsed and perhaps thousands of lives would have been 
spared.  Eyewitness accounts and tape recordings reveal that firefighters laden with heavy 
equipment were unable to ascend the narrow stairs quickly enough to extinguish the fire 
with handheld hose-lines before the buildings collapsed.73 74  Comprehending the 
difficulties of that day and the limits in resources, we can only conclude that traditional 
firefighting could not have extinguished the fire. 
Defining this as a crucial breaking point requires that the FDNY search for an 
answer to the 9/11 Commission’s critical question.  One absolutely frightening answer is 
simply telling New Yorkers that there is no hope for them if they are trapped above the 
fire in a similar attack.  For the FDNY and the fire service, this is clearly not an 
acceptable position to take. A more imaginative solution is to develop new equipment 
that could effectively control the fire.  This potential scenario provides a good illustration 
of how crisis creates opportunities for innovation or a new order.75  Developing a 
firefighting helicopter, designed to shoot a dry chemical extinguishing agent and 
thousands of gallons of water into the upper floors of a high-rise building fire, is one 
innovative idea for solving the problem.   
 
2. Command Capacity 
More broadly than acquiring innovative resources, organizations’ ability to 
command often are outstripped on the strategic level of coordinating joint operations at 
complex events.  The cumulative stress of agencies not working together results in failure 
to exchange information and the creation of separate command structures.  The 9/11 
Commission Report correctly revealed that critical information was not shared among 
73 FDNY Oral Histories, compilation of interviews of fire personnel taken during the recovery phase. 
74 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, audio tapes of the repeater system from the South Tower. 
75 Timothy L. Sellnow, Matthew W. Seeger, and Robert R. Ulmer, "Chaos Theory, Informational Needs, and 
Natural Disasters," Journal of Applied Communication Research 30 (4): 269. 
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decision-makers at the World Trade Center incident.76  On 9/11, the lack of informational 
knowledge pushed the fire department beyond its ability to maintain situational 
awareness.  The root cause of this behavior was discussed in Chapter IV as organizational 
bias.  While understanding the cause of this as systematic, the effects of not 
communicating set the stage for outstripping command capacity.  Without information-
sharing, agencies were limited in comprehending the urgency for evacuation. 
The Commission further explains the importance of coordination, which entails a 
unified command to track all first responders and exchange pertinent information.77  This 
protocol, however, was not used on 9/11 and, instead, parallel commands were 
established for fire and police.  The lack of a unified command outstripped New York 
City’s ability to manage this crisis.  Instead of combining capabilities to strengthen the 
City’s response, agencies operated alone, thus weakening the overall capacity of the 
City’s emergency responders.  For Homeland Security, this exposed a critical need and 
provided an opportunity for major changes in emergency response across the United 
States.   
Viewing established incident management systems as potential breaking points 
during terrorist attacks has caused policy makers to act decisively in establishing a 
national management system that joins response agencies instead of dividing them.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 calls for a National Incident Management 
System (NIMS),78 which was established as part of the National Response Plan.79  The 
principles of this directive are reinforced by recommendations from the 9/11 Commission 
for a nationwide adoption of the Incident Command System.80  Finally, NIMS was 
established as part of the National Response Plan.81  When correctly implemented, NIMS 
effectively adds resiliency into a command system, providing the flexibility to include 
76 The 9/11 Commission Report, 321. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (Washington D.C.: GPO), 4. 
79Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan: Initial Plan (Washington, D.C., 2004). 
80The 9/11 Commission Report, 397. 
81Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan: Initial Plan (Washington, D.C., 2004). 
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many different agencies as part of a unified command and creating an environment that 
supports consistent information exchange. 
 
B. OPERATIONAL ADAPTABILITY 
Adapting quickly and decisively to the surprise of a terrorist attack is something 
commanders must do at the next incident.  It is naive to think we can anticipate and 
prevent every terrorist event, though it is an important goal to pursue.  The surprise of 
when, where and how the United States is attacked is ultimately controlled by the 
terrorist, but the consequences of that surprise are controlled by us.82  It is in the realm of 
consequence management that decision-makers deal with the effects of surprise.  
Adaptability is the capacity to withstand the shock of the surprise attack by remaining 
flexible to new information and having a willingness to be innovative and imaginative in 
adapting to the cumulative stress of the new environment. 
 
1. Dynamic Scenario Planning 
Training people to identify and assess the relevant indicators in a new 
environment, without clinging to preconceived lists of favorite indicators, is a challenge. 
Developing the capacity to imagine what might happen, evaluating the likelihood of 
outcomes and quickly choosing the first feasible option are skills that can be developed 
with time and experience, but are still missing in too many individuals.  
One approach for developing these skills is to expose individuals (and 
organizations) to high-stress training in completely unfamiliar scenarios and then 
rigorously reviewing with trainees the ways they gathered information to help them 
recognize threats, identify central problems and make correct decisions. Ultimately, the 
goal is to help the trainees learn to keep their eyes and minds open to crucial elements in 
situations they have not experienced before. Trainees learn to be willing and able to 
weigh all information for potential worth, including signals that may come from 
unexpected quarters. Their ability to imagine and even anticipate the unthinkable is 
critical to effective decision-making during crises.  
82 Gray, Strategic Surprise, 10. 
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Many scenarios, however, portray a single event absent of a responsive enemy.  
Such static scenarios create two dangerous conditions for emergency responders.  First, 
non-dynamic threat scenarios tend to reinforce our assumption about a pre-conceived 
threat environment. If emergency responders are not forced to deal with uncertainty 
during training, they will continue to incorrectly assume that, even in the midst of a 
response, they will still have time to assess and allocate the right resources for the next 
event.  Second, threat scenarios that are one-dimensional can be managed with standard 
operational procedures.  This eliminates necessary practice in dynamic decision-making 
and command innovation.  In reality, the threat is rarely one-dimensional, but rather is 
multi-level and complex, where protocols need to be adapted to each dimension of the 
threat.  Training against one type of threat can lead us to overestimate our capabilities to 
respond to an extended crisis and underestimate our enemy’s capabilities to attack.  
Continued training against these static scenarios limits thinking and allows complacency 
to emerge.   
Instead, organizations must recognize that the threat is dynamic and characterized 
by extensive uncertainty.  To move beyond preparing for the last war, training must 
challenge and test our assumptions about operating in complex environments, examine 
operational and strategic constraints, and evaluate capabilities to respond effectively to 
challenging, changing events.  This must happen at all levels of the organization, 
especially at the leadership level.  In taking this approach, organizations can begin to 
build flexibility into their planning process.  This type of dynamic planning allows 
organizations to develop new strategies for addressing unimaginable events.  Dynamic 
scenario planning also allows emergency responders to train against a dynamic, 
unpredictable, multi-dimensional enemy.  This gives emergency responders an 
opportunity to exercise operational adaptability for new events.   
 
2. Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness is a critical component of operational adaptability.  It is the 
ability to collect significant information, rapidly process that information and then 
effectively use it to understand the dense context of a constantly evolving incident.  It is 
also the basis for all subsequent decision-making and is, therefore, a crucial element in 
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managing complex incidents.  Successfully achieving situational awareness is 
exceptionally challenging because it requires overcoming many challenges, including 
severe time constraints; incomplete information, lack of information-sharing; complex 
interactions with other agencies (including organizational bias); and the pressure of 
substantial penalties when it not achieved.  For situational awareness to be fully 
developed, it must deal with all of these factors and exist as an incident management 
priority across all participating organizations.   
Situational awareness is particularly critical when dealing with multiple attacks 
and complex rescue operations, as was the case at the WTC.  On 9/11, command and 
control were hindered by deficient situational awareness resulting from the lack of 
information they received, primarily because the information available was not being 
effectively shared with them.  As was explained in Chapter III, it was the cumulative 
effect of inadequate information-sharing that crippled commanders’ situational awareness 
and perpetuated the crisis for the fire department.  Organizations must develop 
capabilities to continually update and share various aspects of the incident, since sharing 
diverse pieces of information among emergency responders is the only way to achieve 
true situational awareness. 
 
3. Flexibility in Decision-Making 
Flexibility in decision-making is dependent on scanning for cues, understanding 
the contextual framework of the situation and recognizing the unexpected.  These are the 
requisite tools of commanders who have to make life or death decisions in a matter of 
moments.  Preparing for the next terrorist surprise requires more than just acquiring new 
technology and equipment, it mandates that commanders possess the knowledge and skill 
to remain flexible when making decisions in complex incidents.  It also mandates that 
when a decision is made to change tactics, it is communicated in a way that is clearly 
understood by the receiver.  The emergency responder who receives the message must 
know on what authority the message is given and the context of the order.  To reinforce 
importance and urgency, the order must be repeated.   
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Confronted with the complexity of the terrorism attacks on 9/11, commanders in 
the North Tower did not simply react to the information they received.  Instead, they used 
each small piece of information to paint a picture of the current situation and used both 
information and intuition as cues to predict and proactively deal with an uncertain future.  
Commanders remained flexible in their decision-making in the midst of uncertainty by 
looking for cues that either fit or did not fit their previous experiences.  It is this ability to 
incorporate unexpected information into decision-making during a crisis that allows 
commanders to be responsive to changing conditions and maintain the necessary degree 
of flexibility without the benefit of pre-planned contingencies.83  Decision-making must 
remain flexible enough to adapt to the changing environment, yet it cannot be overly 
delayed because of uncertainty; commanders need to act decisively during a crisis and 
take action. 
The analysis of decision-making by commanders and emergency responders in 
the North Tower illustrates the need for command and response flexibility.  It further 
demonstrates how situational awareness influences decision-making capabilities.  
Decision-making is dependent on how well organizations share information with each 
other under increasing levels of stress and how they adapt to the new information they 
receive.   
 
4. Innovation 
Innovation is often thought of as a deliberate process that occurs before or after a 
crisis.  However, commanders must be innovative throughout a crisis and encourage 
members at all levels of the organization to find solutions outside standard operating 
procedures. Thousands of people were saved on 9/11 because firefighters and other 
emergency personnel were able to cope with an extremely dangerous and complex 
situation. Innovation improves the effectiveness of an organization to adapt to new 
situations. 
In some cases, a shocking event may even have a positive effect by stimulating 
people to initiate novel actions or create new inventions.84  For example, innovation at 
83 Klein, 279. 
84 Karl Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, 84. 
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the operational level brought the private and public sectors together to address how to 
document the locations where victims, equipment and significant wreckage were found at 
the WTC. The 16-acre World Trade Center site had few recognizable landmarks after the 
collapse, hampering rescuers’ ability to accurately map the points in the rubble where 
they found victims; which were key indicators of other victims’ locations. The FDNY’s 
Planning Chief brought together a team from the private sector to develop a mechanism 
to accurately record these positions in an efficient manner that would be manageable 
within the 10-story pile of debris. Firefighters defined the problem and guided the 
technological solution. Within three days, technical experts created and deployed to 
Ground Zero a global positioning system that worked in conjunction with a small 
handheld computer, which automatically captured time, date and location of items. The 
new technology, developed in response to unexpected requirements identified by 
operational personnel, proved invaluable in assisting the recovery operations.  
Strategic level innovation also occurred following 9/11. At the World Trade 
Center attack, the radio repeater system in the building failed and the point-to-point 
radios were not strong enough to penetrate the highest floors of the 110-story building. In 
the months following the attack, it was an FDNY Captain who came up with an 
innovative solution. He took spare radio parts, assembled them in a suitcase and built a 
portable radio. This high-wattage portable radio, called a “Post-radio,” works with 
existing equipment, forming a dependable portable communication system that is now 
brought to every major emergency. This example not only demonstrates the recognition 
of necessary change, but also shows readiness to adapt by implementing an innovative 
concept.  
In the hours and days following that September morning, there were hundreds of 
other examples of innovation. Some of these innovations proved valuable and others did 
not. Nevertheless, it is impossible to overestimate the importance of the firefighters’ 




This chapter touched on several key aspects of dynamic planning and crisis 
leadership for complex incidents.  First, the analytical use of the “fragility curve,” not 
only helps us to understand how organizational core competencies are outstripped by 
terrorism, as was discussed earlier, but foresee how organizations must dynamically plan 
for future attacks by understanding potential weaknesses and recognizing opportunities 
for change.  The use of the “fragility curve” clearly illustrates the breaking points of those 
organizations that responded on 9/11 when exposed to extreme stress.  It also provides 
government with an opportunity to redesign emergency response organizations to 
withstand a greater level of stress, providing an increase in resiliency.  It is important to 
note that resiliency must be fabricated into preparedness before an event occurs, so that 
when it is needed during complex incidents, commanders can depend on a more durable 
emergency response system.  Failure to anticipate new needs to increase resiliency 
ultimately allows the potential for total system failure. 
Second, a model for operational adaptability incorporates situational awareness, 
flexible decision-making and innovation as necessary elements for resiliency.  What is 
most central to the question of expanding resiliency is how crisis managers can balance 
the demands of routine operations with the immeasurable risk of terrorism.  The issues 
demand fire departments evaluate the opportunity costs of pursuing one endeavor over 
another. Terrorism preparedness is the ultimate insurance question; crisis managers must 
ask themselves, “How much of what type of insurance should they purchase?”  
Emergency responders are not the only organizations asking these questions. 
Private firms, government agencies and individual citizens have to question how much 
they can afford to focus on firefighting capabilities as a security measures at the expense 
of other issues.  An estimated cost of $20 million for a firefighting helicopter used as a 
regional resource for a 100-mile radius around New York City may be far less expensive 
when compared to the billions of dollars paid for the recovery effort.   
The dynamic planning model involves organizational preparedness, operational 
adaptability and construction of synergistic response networks.  It takes into 
consideration the adaptive response elements of core competency, breaking points, 
situational awareness, flexible decision-making and innovation into developing resiliency 
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for commanding complex incidents.  The lessons learned from 9/11 illustrate the need for 
dynamic planning on the organizational and operational levels and its power to spur 









VI. CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING COMMAND RESILIENCY 
Terrorism aims to take away hope. On September 11th, in the dust of the 
collapsed Towers, our world was in its darkest hour, but through the 
darkness, a ray of light appeared. The silhouette of firefighters searching 
for those lost became a symbol for the world, not because so many were 
lost, but because so many were inspired to hope.  
 
With thousands of people trapped and hundreds of rescuers on the scene, critical 
decisions were made to manage the extreme crisis at the World Trade Center on 9/11.  
Those decisions saved an estimated 20,000 people, but at a heavy cost to emergency 
responders; 343 FDNY personnel, 37 NY/NJ Port Authority police officers, 23 NYPD 
police officers and numerous other first responders, as well as good-samaritans, died 
trying to rescue those trapped by the flames and destruction.  The firefighters, police 
officers and emergency personnel were faced with an unimaginable event and performed 
their duties honorably.  Their bravery, heroism and the lives of 2749 people who died at 
the World Trade Center, along with those at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania, will 
always be remembered.  Despite the incredible achievements of first responders on 9/11, 
much apprehension remains regarding what should be done differently to manage the first 
couple of hours of the next extreme incident.   
This author has taken an in-depth and sometimes personal look at commanding 
and managing the multifaceted crisis of the World Trade Center attack.  The actions 
taken inside and outside the Towers were analyzed for systematic insight on crisis 
management.  It is not the intent of this paper to single out the successes and failures of 
individuals or even particular organizations, but rather to use the events of 9/11 to 
examine emergency response as a whole and determine what is needed to build an 
integrated response system that will foster future preparedness.   
Organizations must constantly evaluate the effectiveness of their structure and 
performance as it relates to a dynamic threat environment shaped by vast unknowns that 
may stretch organizations to their limits without notice.  Forward-looking strategies that 
help imagine change after a crisis, but implemented before another crisis occurs, is now 
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critical.  Leaders must move beyond traditional reactive behavior by demanding resilient 
and adaptive approaches for managing complex incidents at both strategic and 
operational levels. 
It is this glimpse of duty at the World Trade Center that may give us the greatest 
opportunity for saving lives in the future.  This paper centered on understanding how 
organizational core competencies and social biases affect information-sharing and 
decision-making when stretched beyond their capacity by the shock and cumulative stress 
of a terrorist attack.  Failure to carefully examine these issues may place emergency 
responders at even greater risk at the next incident.  This author, therefore, proposed an 
adaptive response strategy for command resiliency.   
In order to avoid complacency and a false sense of security, commanders and 
crisis managers must understand that terrorists are extremely adaptive and responsive to 
change in the security environment.  They seek to exploit the weakness of their targets 
and are willing to be patient in their planning and execution.  They enjoy the tactical 
advantage of determining the time, place and method of attack.  The attacks on 9/11 and 
the recent attacks on Madrid’s and London’s transportation systems mark a significant 
evolution in terrorist strategies.  Future attacks may bear the influence of Al Qaeda, but 
may be carried out by small, ad hoc groups with similar mindsets.  CBRNE weapons 
span the gamut of crude to sophisticated military types with both the public and 
emergency responders as targets.  As terrorists move to alternate methods of attack, 
commanders and crisis managers must anticipate the move and ensure a high measure of 
adaptability in their response. 
For emergency response organizations, it is crucial to understand how the 
changing threat environment affects organizational capacity to respond.  Organizations 
should strategically anticipate how to strengthen their core competencies to meet the 
demands of each new threat.  The surprise of a major terrorist attack will push responders 
beyond their normal limits, requiring operational adaptability and innovation.  Crisis 
management demands leadership that is able to foresee organizational breaking points 
and make necessary changes prior to an incident.  Resiliency cannot, however, be totally 
dependent on anticipating the capabilities needed for every event.  It also requires that 
leaders have the ability to adapt to unexpected situations and develop a synergistic 
response network robust enough to manage complex incidents.  Combining anticipated 
risk analysis with adaptive response strategies, along with the ability to overcome 














































Figure 4.   Command resiliency is achieved through organizational preparedness, 
operational adaptability and the ability to overcome organizational bias to 
develop a synergistic response network. 
 
A. ANTICIPATED RISK 
Aaron Wildavsky’s book, Searching for Safety, describes crisis management as 
the balance between ‘anticipation’ and ‘resiliency.’85  A strategy of anticipation is an 
assessment of the community’s vulnerability to risk and its strengths; a strategy of 
                                                     
85 Wildavsky, 77. 
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resilience is the capacity to respond to an incident once it has occurred.86  Building 
resiliency, therefore, requires that emergency responders first consider the dynamic threat 
environment and their organizational vulnerability before they can understand the risk 
and what is needed for preparedness.   
Understanding when an organization’s capacity is outstripped is critical for 
effective command.  Without such knowledge, commanders cannot effectively respond to 
the next crisis.  Organizational breaking points and blindspots in emergency response are 
discovered by examining core competencies in terms of constraints in resources, trained 
personnel and command capacity during the initial stages of an incident.  To lessen the 
extent of uncertainty, organizations need to fully grasp the limits of these capabilities, as 
well as the strengths.  In many cases, organizational change may need to take place to 
enhance its capacity to respond to new threats.   
The World Trade Center attacks illustrate both blindspots and breaking points in 
preparedness.  One blindspot was that engineers and architects never considered the 
possibility that an uncontrolled fire could damage the Towers to the point of causing a 
progressive collapse of the entire buildings.  This blindspot, coupled with the breaking 
point of not being able to extinguish the fire, was significant for emergency responders.  
Understanding the breaking points of 9/11, future building construction must consider the 
damaging effects of fire on their structures and fire departments need to develop the 
capacity to extinguish fires on the upper floors of a high-rise building without depending 
on the building’s integrated systems. 
Dynamic planning that makes use of the “fragility curve” will cause organizations 
to anticipate the consequences of future attacks and effectively prepare for them. The 
intent is not to develop a wish list of new capabilities, but a roadmap for expanding 
existing core competencies.  By capitalizing on inherent strengths of emergency 
responders and working to increase the core competencies of each, organizations will be 
better prepared to meet the challenges of a terrorist incident. 
86 Louse K. Comfort, Yesim Sungu, David Johnson, and Mark Dunn, “Complex System in Crisis: Anticipation 
and Resiliency in Dynamic Environments,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 9 (3): 146. 
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B. ADAPTABILITY  
The capacity to adapt to an unforeseen or changing incident requires timely 
situational awareness, flexible decision-making and innovation. Adaptability is 
demonstrated by evacuation orders given in the North Tower. Commanders used cues to 
realize something was wrong and made a critical decision to evacuate rescuers from the 
building.  Emergency responders with a more accurate situational awareness picture were 
able to more quickly evacuate the building.  This example establishes a direct connection 
between situational awareness and decision-making capacity. This also demonstrates that 
as the complexity of an incident increases, so does the significant demand for accurate 
and timely information and better coordination among agencies.87   
Terrorist incidents, not unlike fires, are usually large in scale, involve maximum 
amounts of damage and are surrounded by uncertainty.  Emergency responders must be 
able to recognize the danger, immediately anticipate the potential scope of damage, and 
respond quickly according to continually changing information.  When confronted with 
dynamic, unpredictable, complex terrorist incidents, adaptive response systems are 
undoubtedly the most successful.   
The WTC has shown the weakness of relying on standard operating procedures 
and parallel commands in a rapidly changing environment.  Instead, it is imperative to 
begin instilling a culture of unified adaptability in order to ensure that future responses 
are as dynamic as the threats.  Establishing the basis for adaptability begins by changing 
the mindset of organizations to become more open to innovation in thinking and unified 
behavior.  An adaptive response strategy involves evaluating the constant loop of 
information scanning, sensemaking, decision-making and innovation.   
 
C. SYNERGISTIC NETWORK 
The complexity and scale of a 9/11-type attack mandate that agencies work 
together.  In a synergistic response network there are multiple core competencies formed, 
not to compete with one another, but rather to complement each other’s capabilities and 
increase overall response capacity.  Adaptability in multiple attacks comes from 
87 Comfort, Complex Systems in Crisis, 144. 
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combining the core competencies of various agencies.88  In the simplest form, fire 
departments perform rescue and mitigate the life hazard; law enforcement investigates 
and provides protection and emergency medical personnel care for patients.  In the initial 
critical hours of an attack, there must be a clear distribution of work, based on an 
understanding of the breaking points of individual organization’s core competencies and 
the need for adaptability during the incident.  
During the initial critical hours of an incident, emergency responders depend on 
multiple core competencies to save lives and mitigate the dangers.  The WTC, in 
particular, clearly demonstrates a need for joint planning among emergency response 
organizations to better withstand the shock and cumulative stress of a complex terrorist 
attack.  Planning to use multiple core competencies enables cities to better adapt to the 
uncertainty of the event.  The key is for cities to create synergies among the different 
levels of emergency response.   
Organizations that are willing to have joint scenario training sessions identify new 
methods of information-sharing and resource allocation at every new scenario.  These 
joint training sessions create a dynamic planning process that results in better 
understanding of each other’s capabilities, as well as better understanding of the potential 
challenges they will encounter during a terrorist attack.  Dynamic planning creates 
flexibility and innovation in adapting to the complexity of a terrorist attack, ultimately 
leading to an increased capacity to mitigate its effects.  Commanders who can train their 
personnel to rapidly gain and share accurate information will operate more effectively 
than less prepared organizations at complex incidents.89  Failure to develop synergistic 
response networks will leave commanders with little resiliency at the next complex 
terrorism incident.  Overcoming organizational bias and combining the strengths of 
emergency organizations will form a robust, synergistic response network.   
 
 
88 Brian Dickerson, “Adaptability: A New Principle of War,” in National Security Challenges for the 21st 
Century, ed. Williamson Murray (Carlisle Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, October 2003), 214. 
89 Mica R. Endsley, et al, Modeling and Measuring Situational Awareness in the Infantry Operational 
Environment, (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2000), 17. 
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D. RESILIENCY 
Organizations that truly comprehend limits in their capacity to withstand the 
shock of a terrorist attack realize that terrorism is multi-dimensional and optimal response 
operations require a more robust emergency response system that is dependent on the 
complementary efforts of many agencies.  Organizations that can assess their own 
breaking points and adapt to an evolving event must build a redundancy in their core 
capabilities, then join with other principle agencies to form a synergistic network for 
response.   
The unpredictable nature of terrorism and the uncertainty of the next attack 
necessitate that preparedness involves redundancy.  Effective command management 
includes contingencies for significant loss of resources and capabilities during the course 
of response and recovery.  9/11 highlighted the catastrophic implications for fire 
departments in relying too heavily on the building construction and inter-agency 
information-sharing in carrying out their primary mission of firefighting and rescue.  The 
WTC’s fire protection, suppression and communication systems failed and there were 
additional breakdowns in systematic inter-agency communication and coordination.  This 
placed the fire department at an extreme disadvantage. FDNY was so dependent on the 
WTC building systems and information from other agencies that failure of these systems 
left them with no redundancy or alternative.  On that fateful day, without their own 
resiliency for information and fire suppression, they did the best they could to rescue 
those who were desperately trapped and needed assistance. 
We should certainly demand better building construction and better 
interoperability among emergency responders, but 9/11 has taught fire departments an 
equally important lesson: they need to ensure continuity of operations in case these 
systems are rendered inoperable again.  Emergency responders must not depend on the 
building for communications.  Instead, they need to bring a communication system to the 
building in the form of high-powered radios and develop a robust communication 
infrastructure.  These systems must have enough resiliency and redundancy built into the 
system to ensure there is no single point of failure.   
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The most successful terrorist attack in history used fire as a weapon and it is 
likely they will continue to seek other incendiary methods.  Fire suppression has always 
been seen as only a component of high-rise buildings.  Fire departments must develop 
alternative firefighting tactics to deal with another 9/11-type fire and not depend solely 
on existing building fire suppression systems.   
Information-sharing is so essential that emergency responders must seek 
information from multiple sources.  Organizations need to build an information system 
that will provide an equal level situational awareness for all responding organizations.   
Gathering information from multiple sources gives the fire department more resilience 
and ensures commanders have the necessary information for critical decisions. 
Information is best gathered, exchanged and made sense of through the use of a 
unified command.  Inherent in emergency responders, however, is an organizational bias 
that produces positive in-group favoritism to those in the same organization and a 
negative out-group prejudice against those who are part of a different group.  
Overcoming these biases is essential to information exchange, decision-making and 
coordination.  This became painfully evident through the analysis of the evacuation from 
the North Tower.  Agencies must actively take the steps outlined in Chapter IV to 
eliminate organizational bias through the use of unified command. 
The principles of redundancy and resiliency do not simply suggest duplication of 
assets or stockpiling of resources.  Redundancy as a strategy is present to help build surge 
capacity into the core competencies and preparedness and response capabilities.  It 
reduces the probability of blindspots in planning and breaking points in response. 
In order to optimize command resiliency, organizations must be able to identify 
threats, assess vulnerabilities of core competencies and determine the impacts of many 
potential incidents.  While organizational security efforts cannot anticipate the time or the 
place of a terrorist attack, they can anticipate the potential effects and ramifications of an 
attack and enhance capabilities to manage potential threats.  They must also be able and 
willing to become more adaptive.  Informing commanders and personnel of all relevant 
information will increase situational awareness for decision-making and innovation.   
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Sharing information contributes to the overall adaptability of command by ensuring that 
the element of surprise is reduced and organizations have the best chance to adapt rapidly 
to a changing situation.   
Command resiliency is the ability to adapt to uncertainty before and during an 
attack.  This is accomplished through dynamic planning that anticipates weaknesses and 
strengthens organizational breaking points.  The use of dynamic scenarios further 
develops adaptability skills for better information exchange, flexible decision-making and 
innovation.  Command resiliency is achieved by overcoming organizational bias and 
through dynamic planning, integrates organizational preparedness and operational 
adaptability into a synergistic response network.   
Senior commanders and crisis managers must continue to develop organizational 
capacity to withstand the cumulative stress of terrorist crises.  They are equally 
responsible for integrating these organizational core competencies into a unified network 
of response.  Failure to build this synergy will result in the inability to provide critical 
service during the initial hours of a terrorist attack.  Careful strategic planning with these 
principles, however, will ensure the development of command resiliency for successfully 
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